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A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 




One of the policy measures which has elicited a great deal of attention especially 
among less developed economies with high man-land ratios is agrarian reform. The 
policy has been thoroughly examined, both in terms of conceptual and empirical 
approaches, as well as employing cross-country or time-series information. However, 
despite the proliferation of these studies and the wealth of information generated from 
these works, very few countries have successfully implemented this policy measure; and 
fewer still are the countries that can actually claim that agrarian reform benefitted their 
rural and national development goals.
The long experience of the Philippines on agrarian reform only illustrates the 
immense implementing problems that this policy measure encountered. Research works 
on the implementation of past and present laws abound, yielding two fundamental 
conclusions. First, unequal landownership has, over time, exacerbated poverty and has 
encouraged inefficient utilization of the scarce resource. And, second, the character and 
pace of the agrarian reform implementation were responsive to the Existing political and 
economic configurations. It is obvious that a policy which ensures a more efficient and 
equitable use of rural land is critical. But to operationalize this, one must invariably 
conduct research on the following areas; (a) different modalities of land reform and/or a 
combination of other efficiency- and equity-directed policies which can reduce or 
minimize the political and economic constraints that impede the efficient and more 
equitable use of rural land; (b) a detailed examination of the political and administrative 
feasibilities of present and alternative policy measures; and (c) an understanding of the 
implications of the implementation of the different agrarian reform components on rural 
development.
•Prepared for the Consultation-Workshop on the Dynamics of Rural Development (DRD) organized by the 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), held on August 30-31, 1991 at Temate, Cavite. The workshop is 
part of the DRD Research Program funded under the Technical Resources Project of the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and coursed through the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
••Associate Dean and Assistant Professor, College of Economics and Management, University of the Philippines at 
Los Baftos.
2This paper is an attempt to present a state of the art of past agrarian reform programs 
m the Philippines with emphasis on the current program The discussion is divided into 
four parts Section 2 traces the origins of the country s agrarian reform efforts using a 
political economy framework The main arguments of this section are that (a) the crux of 
the country s agrarian question is rooted in the skewed land distribution pattern and (b) 
that this particular agrarian structure is a legacy of our colonial expenence and a 
by product of the accumulated adverse effects of the palliative land reform measures 
implemented by past governments as responses primarily to peasant unrest
Section 3 of the paper examines Republic Act No 6657 or the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by first discussing the salient features of the law and then 
specifying its key loopholes as well as the primary beneficiaries and losers from its 
implementation The emphasis of the discussion is on the land reform aspect1 This 
section ends with a discussion of (a) pending bills related to agrarian reform at Congress 
ana t,uj tne alternative agrarian reiorm program initiated by the Congress for People s 
Agrarian Reform (CPAR)
Section 4 of the paper provides an assessment of the implementation of agrarian 
reform while the next section provides a cross country comparison of agrarian reform 
experiences highlighting two sets of country cases namely countries where agrarian 
reform were successfully implemented (i e Japan Taiwan and South Korea) and 
countries where agrarian reform was not successfully enforced (i e China Chile and 
Peru) The purpose of the analysis is partly to draw the similarities and contrasting 
features of these country expenences with the Philippine expenence, and partly to 
emphasize the major lessons from these cross country expenences which the present 
CARL should take into account This discussion hopes to shed light to two questions 
first is land reform a viable development policy9 And second what conditions will 
ensure a feasible implementation of land reform9
The final section identifies the major research areas on agrarian reform which 
emerged from the previous discussion
II AGRARIAN REFORM ISSUE A LEGACY OF THE PAST
The skewed land distnbution pattern in the country is not a product of recent history 
but a legacy of our long colonial expenence From the introduction of the encomienda 
system by the Spaniards through the establishment of the hacienda and their eventual 
growth and development during the American colonial regime the agranan structure in 
the country remained as unequal as ever Consequently peasant revolts and with them 
the usual government response of pursuing palliative reform measures to assuage peasant 
unrest have become an integral feature of Philippine history
1 The hterature on this measure interchangeably use land reform and agranan reform however the two policies 
are quite different Land reform refers to measures which affect the property rights structure of an economy through a 
redistribution of landholdings whereas agrarian reform includes land reform measures as well as the provision of 
ancilliary services such as credit, extension and marketing services
In this paper the focal point of discussion is the land reform measure
3The first recorded uprising with an explicitly tgm nan character2 occurred in 1745 
when five provinces adjacent to M ania revolted against the fnar estates. The rebellion 
was staged in protest over the monastic estates unwarranted usurpation of the natives 
lands and the imposition of the colonial government’s policy of forced labor in order to 
assure a steady supply of labor m these estates (Roth 1982 140) However the uprising 
failed in the sense that concentration of lands in the hands of monastic orders continued 
unabated until the outbreak of the 1896 revolution It was noted that by the end of the 
Spanish penod, more than 185 000 hectares (ha) or one fifth of the cultivated lands 
110 000 ha of which were in the vicinity of Manila, were owned by religious orders 
(Hayami, Quisumbing and Adnano 1990 45) For this reason the fnar estates invariably 
became the focal pomt of the peasant struggles from the 1745 upnsing to the 1936 
Sakdalista revolt, and up to the protest actions of peasant organizations sympathetic to the 
Huk movement in the 1950s Likewise it is also for this reason that when the Amencans 
finallv subdued the Filipinos, the settlement of the unrest in the friar estates became one 
of their pnonties
Immediately upon his appointment as the Civil Governor of the new colony William 
H Taft went to Rome to negotiate with the Pope for the purchase of friar lands in the 
Philippines The move was motivated by the belief that the highly unjust agrarian 
structure obtaining m the friar estates had been a major source of peasant unrest After 
repeated attempts Taft finally succeeded when the Pope agreed to sell 166 000 ha of the 
fnar s landholdings for the amount of $7 million (Agoncillo and Guenero 1982 431 2 
cf Constantino 1975 297) Ostensibly the land was bought for distnbution to about 
60 000 tenants but because of their ignorance of the law (l e how to acquire and title the 
lands) and the colonial government’s policy of selling the lands at a pnce by which it 
could recover the purchase pnce plus the interest on the bonds it had floated to raise the 
cash ' the bulk of these estates went to Amencan firms and businessmen and landlords 
(Constantino 1975 297 98) Another scheme introduced by the Amencan colonial 
regime to alleviate the agranan problem was the homesteading program This involved 
encouraging Filipinos to migrate and settle to unpopulated and uncultivated areas in order 
to encourage the development of these places Unfortunately since Filipinos preferred to 
stay m sitios and poblaciones leaving their farms behind the program failed to attract 
sufficient participants (Constantino 1975 300 Pelzer 1948 104 14)
Because of the failures of the above measures, peasant dissatisfaction remained 
unabated Thus, in 1933 under the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, a law was 
passed by the Philippine Legislature to ameliorate the condition of nee tenants Called 
the Rice Tenancy Act (Public Act No 4054) of 1933 it attempted to regulate
2 There were of course numerous revolts staged by the Filipinos before this year but historians (e g Constantino 1975 
Roth 1982) agree that they were primarily caused by other factors On the basis of the dominant cause of the rebellion, 
historians categorize them into three 1) those which were reactions to Spanish conquest of the islands and these 
struggles usually occurred before the mid 17th century 2) those which took nativistic coloration, t e return to their 
old ways and native religion essentially led by So-called messianic leaders examples of these were the nativistic revolts 
of Tamblot, Bankaw Tupas and Dagohoy and 3) those armed struggles which were precipitated by the unjust agranan 
structure (Hayami Quisumbing and Adnano 1990 45)
4landlord-tenant relationship by stipulating, among others, a 50-50 sharing arrangement, a 
10 percent interest ceiling on loans by the tenants, and non-dismissal of tenants on 
tenuous grounds. Again, this proved to be another ineffective measure because of the 
qualifying provision that it would only apply to areas where majority of the municipal 
council members petitioned for the implementation of the law in their place (Riedenger 
1991: 204-5; Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano 1990: 54), Commonwealth President 
Manuel L. Quezon continued the effort of the colonial government, but just like his 
predecessors, he emphasized ameliorative measures rather than redistributive ones. 
Under his "social justice" program, he regulated tenancy relations, revived the land 
resettlement program, founded the National Rice and Com Corporation (NARIC) to 
regulate the buying and selling prices of palay and rice, established an agricultural credit 
fund under the "Rice and Com Fund," etc. (Adriano and Redondo 1990: 9-11).
The outbreak of the war provided a temporary halt to the impending confrontation 
between landlords and tenants as the attention and resources of the nation were diverted 
to resisting the Japanese invaders. But as soon as the war terminated, agrarian unrest 
resurfaced, in fact, with a vengeance. This time, the previously uncoordinated peasant 
challenges found their organized expression through the Huk movement. So acute was 
the challenge posed by the Huk that the US prodded the Philippine government to 
undertake a comprehensive study of the agrarian situation. Commissioned to conduct this 
was a land reform specialist named Robert S. Hardie. Three recommendations 
highlighted the Hardie Report (1952). These were: (a) the abolition of share tenancy; (b) 
the establishment of owner-operated family-sized farms as the basis of the rural economy; 
and (c) the establishment of fair tenancy practices for those who unavoidably continue to 
work on the land as tenants (Monk 1990: 31).3
Unfortunately, the administration of President Elpidio Quirino did not heed the 
recommendations of the Hardie Report preferring instead the continuation of the policy of 
land resettlement. In 1950, for instance, President Quirino created the Land Settlement 
and Development Corporation (LASEDECO), a body which took over the land 
resettlement task of the defunct National Land Settlement Administration (NSLA) under 
the American colonial government and its successor under the Commonwealth 
government, the Rural Progress Administration (RPA). In turn, LASEDECO was 
primarily employed by then Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay for his resettlement 
program for Huk surrenderees as an attempt to convince others to lay down their arms.
Having been rejected as a "radically-oriented, communist-inspired" work, the Hardie 
Report could not find fulfillment in the context of a landlord-dominated government4 
Even Ramon Magsaysay, who won the presidency in 1953, despite his recognition of the 
agrarian character of the Huk rebellion, was unsuccessful in undertaking a meaningful
3. The work of Monk (1990) is an excellent attempt to provide the readers detailed background information on the 
evolution of the Hardie Report and its aftermath..
4. Monk (1990: chap. 3) has an interesting discussion of how the landlords in the government persecuted Hardie to a 
point where even the US government had to apologize for (and distance itself from) the work.
5redistributive measure. Although he passed a number of legislations to mitigate the 
worsening agrarian situation, they were all short of the land redistribution goal. Two of 
these legislations are worth mentioning, namely: the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA No. 
1199) of 1954, and the Land Reform Act (RA No. 1400) of 1955.
The former was meant to guarantee fair tenancy practices and facilitated the 
transformation of tenants into leaseholders. Unfortunately, Congress derailed the 
enforcement of the provision of the Act by providing only a measly sum to the program, 
exempting sugar tenants from becoming leaseholders, and impeded the work of the Court 
of Agrarian Relations which was purportedly established to adjudicate agrarian disputes 
(Riedenger 1991:206-7).
On the other hand, the Land Reform Code of 1955 provided for the expropriation and 
distribution of large estates to their tenants. But like the 1954 Agricultural Tenancy Act, 
its provisions were watered-down by a landlord-dominated Congress to the point of 
ineffectivity. Whereas the original bill would subject to land reform private agricultural 
lands in excess of 144 ha, Congress raised the retention ceiling to 300 contiguous ha for 
privately-owned rice farms, 600 ha for lands owned by a corporation, and 1.024 ha for 
private lands devoted to crops other than rice (Riedenger 1991:208).'Moreover, the 
legislature inserted an additional provision stipulating that lands could only be subjected 
to the redistributive program only if the majority of the tenants petitioned the government 
for the implementation of land reform in the estate they till.
By raising the ceiling to 300 ha and adding the qualification "contiguous," Congress 
virtually assured the failure of the program. Landlords could easily subdivide their land 
and distribute them to their children or relatives, or sell parcels of their estate in order to 
break it up, thereby making it eligible for exemption because of its non-contiguous 
character. In addition, in view of the iron-grip hold on the estate, it would be difficult for 
the tenants to organize themselves to petition government to place the land they till under 
the reform program. Given these loopholes of the Code, it was, therefore, not surprising 
that less than 20,000 ha, or less than four-tenths of one percent of total cultivated lands in 
the country, were acquired by the government for distribution to the tillers (Hayami, 
Quisumbing and Adriano 1990:56).
It should be noted that by this time the Huk insurgency problem had already been 
successfully liquidated by the government, and thus, the urgency for restructuring the 
unjust agrarian structure had vanished. Coupled with the advent of the Cold War era and 
the extension of the McCarthyist witch hunt to the Philippine shore, it became more 
difficult to organize for reform for fear of being branded as a "communist" by the 
landlords and their allies in the government Consequently, the mass constituency 
pushing for agrarian reform implementation was effectively muzzled, and, as a result the 
redistributive measure was relegated to the background to the point of oblivion in the 
public consciousness. Under the administration of President Carlos Garcia, who 
succeeded President Magsaysay, no land reform law nor amendments to correct the flaws 
of the 1955 Land Reform Code, was passed. Instead, the new administration 
concentrated its efforts in industrializing the economy through the adoption of the
6"Filipino First" policy,5 where a plethora of subsidies, incentives and protection was 
extended to import-substituting, mostly Filipino-owned, industries. Ironically, while the 
industrialization policy was being pursued under the aegis of nationalist fervor, the same 
nationalism failed to champion the cause of agrarian reform, a measure which the vast 
majority of the poor tillers in the countryside supported. This was not a paradoxical result 
because leading nationalist figures at that time were also among the biggest landowners 
then. For instance, the great nationalist Garo M. Recto, a big landlord himself in his 
home province of Batangas, was one of the staunch detractors of Magsaysay’s land 
reform program. But unlike the conservative landlords who referred to supporters of the 
agrarian reform as "communists," Recto condemned the program as a "United 
States-inspired initiative designed to perpetuate an agriculturally-based Philippine 
economy, and, in turn, a dependency relationship with the US" (Hayami, Quisumbing, 
and Adriano 1990: 209). Similarly, leading Pampanga congressman Diosdado Macapagal 
(who would later become the President of the country), who was referred to as the "poor 
boy from Lubao" as a tribute to his humble beginnings, was one of the most outspoken 
critics of the Hardie Report.
Given the peculiar development of the entrepreneurial class in the country, it is futile 
to expect that, as in the case of Western Europe and other developed countries of today, 
where the industrialist class found an objective interest in supporting the reform measure, 
the bifurcation of interests between a land-based elite and a fledgling industrialist class 
cannot be expected in the Philippine case. Because the division has not emerged here 
since the landlords and industrialists are one and the same in our society. The implication 
of this on the alliance-building task to push for the reform program is that it will be more 
difficult for land reform to succeed here given the complementary nature of the interests 
of the elite groups whose properties are the target for the redistributive program.6
5. An excellent discussion of this nationalist policy is contained in the work of Golay (1961).
6. Other authors (see for instance Wurfel 1983; Riedenger 1990; and Balisacan 1990a and 1990b) offer different 
explanations/interpretations as to why the agrarian reform program did not succeed in this country. However, I find the 
thesis forwarded by Balisacan highly controversial. He argued that "the nature of past land reform program is politically 
optimal, given the prevailing political market" then (1990b: 2). This conclusion was derived from the analysis that 
unlike other East Asian countries (e.g„ Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) which successfully undertook a comprehensive 
agrarian reform program, the successive attempts failed here because they did not possess favorable political factors 
(i.e., a weakened landlord class, the support of a nearly authoritarian regime run by Allied forces, a better trained and 
educated bureaucracy, and a relatively organized peasantry) enjoyed by the former. Because of powerful forces ranged 
against the redistributive measure here, which were not eliminated nor tempered by endogenous or exogenous factors, 
Balisacan distilled that the achievements of past land reform programs, no matter how limited they were from 
standpoints of the peasants and agrarian reform scholars, could already be considered as "politically optimal." 
Unfortunately, such a theoretical positioning actually begs rather than answers the question as to why agrarian reform 
was unsuccessful in the country. Assuming, for example, that we were able to obtain the favorable political factorshe 
cited, would these assure success? To what degree should we attain them to become successful? And if we achieved 
them and still failed, would it be considered "politically optimal" by Balisacan? How does one determine what is 
"politically optimal" in a given situation? Can one determine in an a priori or on an ex post factor basis? flf it is on the 
basis of the latter, then it is a useless thesis because it does not have a predictive capability).
7The tremendous clout o f die landowning class was again confirmed in the attempt by 
President Macapagal to implement an agrarian reform program under his term. Being 
more conversant with the problems' of die poor tillers (since he was bom from a poor 
peasant couple, as we mentioned earlier), he enacted the Land Reform Code of 1963 (RA 
No. 3844), a law considered by scholars (i.e., Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano 1990: 
36) as representing a major advance from its predecessors. Primarily, it was the first 
reform Act that made the attainment of "owner*cultivatorship and family-based farms" 
(Section 2 of the Act) in rice and com lands as the stated goal of the measure. This 
objective was to be attained through the "Operation Leasehold” and "Operation Land 
Transfer" programs.
The former involved the conversion of share tenancy into leasehold tenancy by fixing 
rent at 25 percent of the average harvest in the three normal years preceding the program 
while the latter entailed expropriation and distribution of lands in excess of 75 ha 
(Hayami, Quisumbing, and Adriano 1990: 57). Furthermore, the Code also recognized 
the need for adequate agricultural support services for the reform program to succeed by 
providing for the creation of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) and the 
Agricultural Productivity Commission (APC). The first was meant to extend cheap credit 
to small farmers while the second was intended to provide technical assistance to the 
tillers. But due to a number of reasons, ranging from inadequate funding to 
mismanagement and outright graft and corruption, these institutions failed to accomplish 
their mandate (Adriano and Redondo 1990:35-6).
Also, it is problematic whether the favorable political factors he mentioned were absent in the country. We have a 
severely weakened landlord class after the war because of the major devastation (social, political and economic) 
wrought by the Japanese on the countryside; a highly mobilized and politicized peasantry, at least in Central and 
Southern Tagalog regions, existed; a relatively good idea of what estates should be covered by the reform measure in 
the rice and com haciendas of Central and Southern Tagalog regions (which were anyway the targets of the reform 
measure then); a supportive though not necessarily determined American liberation luce; and an explosive agrarian 
situation which threatened the very survival of the system. Yet, despite these favorable factors, agrarian reform still 
failed.
The answer to this enigma lies in understanding the historical evolution of the struggle for agrarian reform itself and 
the relationship of the forces, both internal and external, that were ranged in favor of and against i t  One must 
understand, for instance, why the Americans pursued with determination land reform in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
while it dilly-dallied in the case of the Philippines. Obviously, one cannot find the answer by looking at the marginal 
preferences of or costs to the actors of choosing one decision over another. To solve the mystery, one must look for 
their objective interest in a given situation.
Undoubtedly, the Americans had an objective interest in pursuing land reform in Japan because the structural basis 
of the jingoistic disadvantage of the Japanese Imperial Army was the emperor system, upon which the whole foundation 
of landlordism/feudalism was built. This was true of South Korea where the advances in redistributive program of the 
communist in the North became-an excellent selling point for its cause. In other words, the bankruptcy of landlordism 
in China and Taiwan had resulted in massive support for the communist struggle and eventually, its victory. As such, 
the US had to do something drastic about the unjust agrarian structure and this was achieved by the implementation of a 
comprehensive land reform program.
In sharp contrast, the landlord class (particularly the sugar bloc) in the country was the most ardent and staunch 
supporter of the American presence here. Thus, it was congenial to the interest of the US to preserve it end this explains 
its vacillating support to the program. During the height of the Huk rebellion, the US-sponsored Hardie Report came up 
with a list of radical recommendations meant to restructure lan downer ship in the countryside. However, once things 
settled down (i.e., with the demise of the Huk threat), support for the Hardie Report ostensibly waned (Monk 1990).
8Despite its positive contributions, Macapagal’s land reform measure, just like the 
previous ones, contained loopholes which conveniently afforded the landlords to evade 
the reform law. First, the provision on the imposition of progressive land tax contained in 
the original bill was expunged from the final version. Second, lands devoted to other 
crops aside from rice and com were excluded from die reform program. Third, the law 
did not stipulate penalties against landlords who obstructed implementation of or evaded 
the enactment by planting other crops in their lands. And fourth, implementation of the 
reform measure in a particular place could only be undertaken once the government, 
through its National Land Reform Council, declared that government agencies in the 
region were fully operative and ready to handle the task (Adriano and Redondo 1990; see 
also Monk 1990: 84). As expected, Macapagal’s land reform version floundered as it 
achieved less than what Magsaysay’s reform program attained.7
No policy initiative on agrarian reform was undertaken by President Ferdinand 
Marcos during his first term in office. What was passed under his second term during the 
period of liberal democracy was an initiative emanating from Congress. And even in this 
limited effort, the law was enacted as a response to the pressure of highly politicized 
students, peasants and workers who combined forces in lobbying for reforms to be 
undertaken in the economy, particularly-the agricultural sector. The response came in the 
form of the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA No. 6389) of 1971 which declared the entire 
archipelago as a land reform area and concomitantly outlawed share tenancy by ruling 
automatic conversion of all share tenants into leaseholders. Moreover, it dramatically 
reduced the land retention ceiling from Macapagal’s 75 ha to seven ha. However, the law 
did not see the day of implementation as it was overtaken by the declaration of martial 
law in 1972.8
This inability to satisfactorily explain social phenomena in the political economy is actually symptomatic of the 
inherent flaws of the neoclassical approach to political economy adopted by Balisacan in tackling the agrarian reform 
problem. Balisacan could have not possibly avoided his theoretical mistakes because of the very limitations of his 
framework. Because of its ahistorical nature, the neoclassical approach cannot possibly capture the complexity of social 
forces entangled in a struggle for reform. By abstracting too much from reality, it often leads to an over-simplified and 
reductionist presentation of the process of social change.
Another good example of the limitation of the neoclassical approach to political economy is the work of Campos 
(1990). Resorting to the usual marginal preference and mathematical equation approach, he thought he could solely 
explain the process of development in Taiwan. The result was nothing short of a colonialism. It indirectly led to the 
ridiculous conclusion that colonialism (both coming from the mainland and the US) was a good process (i.e., it forced 
Taiwan to undertake agrarian reform and to switch to a outward-looking industrialization strategy). The mistake of 
Campos here, just like Balisacan, was to forget to analyze the objective interest of the colonizers and the constellation of 
political and economic forces ranged against each other in the struggle for reform.
7. Balisacan (1990a: S) calculated that Macapagal’s Land Reform Code only distributed 3,342 ha compared to 
Magsaysay’s (inclusive of President Garcia’s since he did not pass any reform law) of 16,000 ha. On the other hand, 
Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano (1990:59) gave a higher estimate: it was around 25,000 ha for Magsaysay and only 
about 14,000 ha for Macapagal.
8. Interestingly, Marcos used land reform as one of the justifications for the imposition of his authoritarian regime, 
declaring it as the "cornerstone" program of his administration. Ironically, the same aggrupations that forced Congress to 
enact the highly progressive 1971 Code of Agrarian Reform became the immediate targets for repression by the martial 
law regime. Consequently, the pressure from a highly-mobilized peasantry, one of the ingredients of a successful reform 
program, was eliminated by Marcos. Aside from doubts regarding the political determination of Marcos to pursue to its 
successful conclusion the redistributive measure, the liquidation of the pro-reform groups from the politico-economic 
landscape as one of the key factors that led to the limited coverage of Marcos’ reform program and its eventual failure.
9Five days after the imposition of martial law on September 21,1972, Marcos released 
the first of a series of enactments in his own version of land reform. Presidential Decree 
(PD) No. 2, obviously getting its inspiration from old Congress which Marcos abolished, 
declared the entire country as a land reform area. However, this proclamation was 
qualified a month later when he issued PD 27 which confined die effectivity of the 
directive only to rice and com lands. It further announced that rice and com tenants were 
now "deemed owners" of the land they were cultivating and the mechanism to attain this 
was through the Operation Land Transfer and Operation Leasehold programs. As in 
Macapagal’s version, the first entailed transfer of land owner ship to the peasants via the 
amortization payment scheme while the latter involved conversion of share tenants into 
leaseholders (payment of a fixed rent).
The retention ceiling was pegged by PD 27 to seven ha. The beneficiaries were given 
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to signify participation in the program, and after 
completion of their payment schedule which should be within 15 years, an Emancipation 
Patent (EP) would be given to the tillers.9 But as in the case of its predecessors, Marcos’ 
land reform was plagued by a number of flaws, among which were:
1. Only lands used for farm production by 1972 were covered by the program. 
Thus, those areas which were placed under cultivation from 1973 onwards were 
exempted from the law. Estimates put this area to be around 1.24 million ha.
2. The retention ceiling of seven ha was still high compared to that of other 
East Asian countries which successfully undertook land reform. For instance, 
Taiwan pegged the ceiling to three ha.
3. Landlords were allowed to retain seven ha while Japan and South Korea 
imnosed zero retention for absentee landlords.
A.
4. Only rice and com lands were subjected to the redistributive measure 
despite the fact that land distribution in other crops (e.g., sugar and coconut) was 
highly unequal as those prevailing in the staple crops sector. This severely limited 
the scope/coverage of the program.
5. And the cumbersome process of obtaining land proved to be a major 
obstacle in the rapid implementation of P.D. 27.10
In view of these inadequacies, and despite the bold pronouncements of Marcos, his 
reform program had only modest achieve ments. Various authors give conflicting 
estimates from a low of about 32,000 ha by Balisacan (1990a: 5) to a high of nearly half a
9. The price of the land was set at 23  times the value of an average annual production, at 6.0 percent interest rate 
payable to the Land Bank within a 15-year period. In turn, Land Bank was supposed to pay the landlords 90 percent of 
the cost of the land in the form of Land Bank bonds while the rest would be paid in cash by the tiller (Hayami, 
Quisumbing, and Adriano 1990: 60).
10. For a discussion of the limitations and problems of PD 27, refer to Mangahas (1991); Hayami, Quisumbing, and 
Adriano (1990:60-70); Monk (1990: 83-108); and Riedenger (1990:212-26).
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niillion by Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano (1990: 68). But even if we accept the latter 
figures, lands actually distributed to the tillers hardly made a dent on the problem of 
skewed land distribution because they merely comprised less than 5 percent of total area 
cultivated. In contrast, the land reform program of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
covered 41, 33 and 30 percent, respectively, of total farm lands (Riedenger 1991:354).
On the positive side, however, PD 27 indeed achieved more than the past reform laws. 
In addition, it was able to break up large, haciendas in Central Luzon thereby partially 
defusing peasant unrest in the area. And because of the benefits of modem rice 
technology and the depressing effect of inflation on the amortization payment, the 
beneficiaries were able to improve their economic plight.
But because of the limited number of beneficiaries compared to the number of tillers, 
tenants and landless alike, and the confinement-of the program to rice and com farms, the 
vast majority of the poor cultivators remained untouched by the measure, and this 
sometimes led to some unpleasant results.11 PD 27 thus unequivocally demonstrated the 
drawbacks of a reform measure which, at the very beginning, was already handicapped 
and hounded by many critical implementation problems:
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN 
REFORM LAW (CARL)
12The Legal Foundations o f CARL: Embodiments o f Class Interest
The ascendancy of Corazon C. Aquino to the presidency in February 1986 created 
great expectations that a land reform that is comprehensive, in terms of farmland area and 
rural landless population to be covered, would be implemented. Unfortunately, Aquino 
did not seize the political opportunity to initiate such a reform and instead abdicated the 
■task of defining land reform to Congress.
The efforts of the Aquino government in land reform prior to the formal 
Congressional convention were limited to the following initiatives: (a) the newly-ratified 
Constitution which, inter alia, provided the legal framework for the formulation of the 
land reform program; (b) the Accelerated Land Reform Program (ALRP), the policy 
version produced by top-level officials in the government; (c) Proclamation No. 31 
which embodied her government’s commitment to redistributive reform; and (d) 
Executive Order (EO) No. 229 which outlined the mechanics of implementing the reform.
Unlike its 1935 predecessor, the 1987 Philippine Constitution committed the 
government to undertake redistributive reform affecting all agricultural lands and natural 
resources and favoring both tenant-farmers and regular farmworkers (Article II, Section 
21 and Article XIII, Section 24). The other salient features of the agrarian reform policy
11. One of these was the emergence of the phenomenon of subtenancy wherein previous tenants turned 
owner-cultivators now hire the services of landless tillers to work the land while the former engage in other profitable 
farm or non-farm activities (Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano (1990).
12. This section draws heavily from the recent work of the author with Quisumbing (1988).
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specified in this Charter are: (a) the retention limit will be prescribed by Congress; (b) 
landlords will be justly compensated; (c) alternative measures to land distribution, such as 
voluntary land sharing, will be considered; (d) the government will encourage landowners 
to invest the proceeds in rural-based industries; (e) private corporations can lease as 
much as 1,000 ha of public agricultural lands while local citizens can lease no more than 
500 ha; and (f) the state will provide support services to farmer-beneficiaries and affected 
landowners (Article XIII, Sections 3-8).
The Constitutional framework for the agrarian reform law has several loopholes. One 
major weakness is the broad criteria (i.e., "ecological, developmental, and equity 
considerations"), which Congress can use in determining the land ceiling and the priority 
areas. The broad criteria have enabled the landlord bloc in Congress to limit the scope of 
land redistribution, as well as increase the options available to landowners for evading the 
reform.
Another loophole in the Constitution’s agrarian reform provisions was that it made 
voluntary land sharing a substitute for land redistribution. Although a variety of 
voluntary land sharing schemes are possible, they provide mechanisms for landlords to 
grant land use rights to tenants or landless workers on a temporary basis without 
fundamentally changing the distribution of land ownership or the form of productive 
organization. Because the schemes are of temporary nature, agricultural workers have, 
therefore, no permanent access to land.13
Lastly, the very large hectarage limits for public lands which corporations and 
individuals can avail of through lease contracts with the government would ensure the 
continued operation of plantations. The past experience of the country is replete with 
instances when domestic and foreign agribusiness enterprises were able to augment their 
landholdings by using a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. For example, it was 
through the intercession of government agencies, notably the National Development 
Corporation and the Bureau of Lands, that multinational corporations like Castle and 
Cooke, Del Monte, and Guthrie, were able to lease lands in excess of the 1,024 hectarage 
ceiling as fixed by the 1935 Constitution (Adriano 1988).
After the Constitution was overwhelmingly ratified in February 1987, the President 
organized a Cabinet Action Committee on Agrarian Reform to come up with a draft 
program for. the government. After several months* of deliberation, the Cabinet Action 
Committee proposed the Accelerated Land Reform Program (ALRP).
13. Voluntary land sharing schemes have been initiated in Negros Occidental, the leading sugar-producing province of 
the country where haciendas (or large plantations) dominate.
Under this scheme, sugar plantation owners could devote 60 percent of their land to the cultivation of their original 
crops, 30 percent to other crops in line with the government’s crop diversification program, and 10 percent to 
subsistence crops which would be cultivated by workers for their own consumption. This scheme contradicts the 
purpose of equalizing landownership distribution since it enables landowners to keep their landholdings intact Neither 
does it induce a transition toward smaller-sized farms, which are more consistent with the country’s resource 
endowments, and whose size increases flexibility in crop diversification.
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The highlights of ALRP are as follows: (a) a seven-hectare ceiling for all croplands; 
(b) the sequencing of land distribution, starting with large privately-owned farms as well 
as rice and com lands covered by PD 27, and ending with small farms and alienable and 
disposable public lands; (c) exempted areas such as ancestral tribal lands and lands used 
for public service; (d) tenancy regulation; and (e) voluntary landsharing and corporate 
stock sharing as alternative schemes to land reform.14
The ALRP is in marked contrast from the previous administrations’ land reform 
measures, because of its comprehensive coverage of target areas and beneficiaries. 
ALRP’s proposal of a single retention limit for all croplands is also a more efficient and 
effective strategy vis-a-vis a variable land ceiling. Variable retention limits would 
encourage distortionary shifts in crop production, increase the scope of evasion by 
landowners, and encourage rent-seeking activities by government personnel. However, 
recommendations to exempt several land use categories from redistribution, as well as to 
consider corporate stock sharing and voluntary land sharing as substitutes to land 
redistribution, would enhance the capacity of uncooperative landlords to evade its 
provisions and increase the scope for bureaucratic delay. Finally, banning the use of share 
tenancy contracts would reduce the opportunities of landless agricultural workers to 
improve their position along the agricultural ladder.
The Aquino government did not adopt the ALRP but instead drafted another 
document, i.e., Executive Order (EO) No. 229. EO 229 was fundamentally different in 
spirit and content from the ALRP. Indeed, much of EO 229 focused on the administrative 
procedures and not on the substance of an agrarian reform measure. For instance, EO 299 
detailed the mechanics of land registration, private land acquisition and the compensation 
procedures to land owners. It also painstakingly specified the composition and functions 
of the governing entities which will coordinate and supervise the implementation of the 
program. It did not, however, resolve key land reform issues such as the retention limit 
and the priority areas. Instead these were left for Congress to define.
How did Congress respond to this challenge? Both Houses produced their own 
agrarian bills: Senate Bill TSB) 249 and House Bill (HB) 400. The salient features of the 
two bills are compared in Table 1.
While both bills were committed to an agrarian reform that will affect all agricultural 
lands regardless of the crops grown, the tenurial arrangements practised and, whether 
these are public- or privately-owned, both contained numerous qualifications which 
limited the scope of the reform. Thus, not only did these bills recommend variable 
retention limits, depending on the crops cultivated and types of landowners, but also 
stipulated a list of exempted areas aside from those already mentioned in EO 229 as well 
as an array of alternative schemes for redistribution.
The contents of the two bills reflected the interests of the major groups represented in 
both Houses of Congress. The local landlord class is dominant in the Lower House where
14. The latter scheme essentially enables corporate landowners to distribute corporate stock shares equivalent to the 
value of the land owned instead of distributing land itself to their workers.
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Table 1
Salient Features of Senate Bill Ho. 249 
and House Bill No. 400 
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Agrarian Return Provisions 249 400
Land Ceiling (in ha)
Retention lieit for landowners 5 7 + 3 for each heir
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beneficiaries 3 3
Rice and corn lands under 






E0 229 specified x x
Parks, forest reserves, 
eangroves, Nildlife
grounds, watersheds x







sites, lands for the un­
privileged x
Fares under corporate stock 




Private fares >50 ha 1 3
Private fares between
24 and 50 ha 2 3






Senate Bill House Bill 
Agrarian Refort Provisions 249 400
Corporate fans with lease, 
production or eanageeent
contracts with local entities 
Corporate farts with lease 
contracts for public lands
> 1,000 ha
Corporate farts with lease 
contracts for public lands
< 1,000 ha






public lands 2 1
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a/
N.I. teans no liait.
b/
Includes tilitary reservations, school sites, public and 
private research and experiaental farts, penal colonies, 
quarantine centers, farts devoted to production of seeds and 
other planting taterials, and lands used for religious purposes.
c/
Nuabers indicate the order of priorities with nuaber 1
being the first areas to be retorted, followed by nuaber 2. and
lastly, the areas with nuaber 3.
d /
Soae of these are exeapted froa land refora (tee exeapted
lands) while the rest will be the last areas to be retorted.
e/
Contracts to be honored for 5 years, subject to 
renegotiations of teres, before these are retorted.
f/
Contracts will be honored for 3 years.
g/
NNCs are aultinational corporations.
h/
Contracts will be honored until expiration date of these 
arrangeaents.
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more than half of the membership are either "landowners or have landlord patrons for 
whose interests they act as surrogates" (Doronila 1988: 8). In contrast, the Senate is 
basically urban-based with economic interests in the industrial and commercial sectors. 
For most Senators, social and political stability in the countryside is critical for industrial 
and commercial development. For that reason, land reform is considered necessary. 
Moreover, from their viewpoint, export diversification and scale economies in production 
and marketing are the keys to rural development. For this consideration, foreign 
participation, especially from multinatiohal corporations, and large local agribusiness 
enterprises should not be thwarted but encouraged.
The legal measures and the debates which immediately preceded the passage of the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) reflected to a large degree (a) the 
competing interests among the propertied class itself; and (b) the nature and extent of 
compromises which these classes are willing to concede to the popular clamor for a 
comprehensive agrarian reform law. As Quisumbing and Adriano (1988) observed, the 
propertied class has diversified — from the absentee laiidowners controlling decentralized 
estates and hacienda-type landowners both of whom were dominant during the first half 
of the 20th century, to a spectrum of landowner categories comprising of the traditional 
landowner types, entrepreneurial landowners cultivating medium- and small-sized farms, 
and indigenous- and foreign-controlled agribusiness landowners. While the perspectives 
of these landowners varied with respect to the form of the agrarian reform law, they were 
able to agree on a common ground rule which Ledesma (1980) aptly puts as, "no class 
legislates itself out of existence." The provisions which embodied this principle and 
which were consistently present in the legal measures prior to CARL were: (1) the long 
transitional time frame for the implementation of reform; and (2) non-land transfer 
schemes. Both provisions enabled the landowners sufficient time and leeway to devise 
evasive measures to land reform. But as shall be noted below, the CARL does reflect a 
preference for a particular sector in the propertied class and it is this sector which has 
determined the boundaries of its concessions to the intended reform beneficiaries.
Salient Features o f the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
Coverage and Timetable for Distribution. Qn 10 June 1988, President Aquino 
signed into law the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, otherwise known as Republic 
Act (RA) No. 6657.
At first glance, the law appears to be a departure from the traditional pattern of 
Philippine land reform legislation as it shifts from tenure regulations and grain crops to an 
agrarian reform program covering all public and private agricultural lands regardless of 
tenurial arrangements and crops produced. The area coverage of the program is 10.3 
million ha and is projected to benefit some 3.9 million rural-based producers and 
workers15 (Table 2). Land acquisition and distribution shall be accomplished within a 
period of 10 years, commencing on 10 June 1988 and ending on 10 June 1998. It shall be




The Scope of RA 6637 by Land Type, Phase, Area 
Coverage, and Intended Beneficiaries
Nusber of






Phase I 1.054.8 10.24 631.7 16.19
1. Rice and corn lands 727.6 7.07 322.7 13.40




250.0 2.43 83.3 2.14
lands
4. Bovernnent-owied agri­
2.3 0.02 0.B 0.02
cultural lands 74.5 0.72 24.8 0.63
Phase II 7.659.8





4,595.0 44.63 1,721.0 44.11
2. ISF areas 1,880.0 1B.26 626.7 16.06
3. Resettlements
4. Private agricultural lands
478.5 4.65 159.3 4.09
exceeding 50 ha 706.3 6.86 235.4 6.03
Phase III 1.381.0 
1. Private agricultural lands
13.36 527.0 13.51
bctueen 5 and 24 ha 
2. Private agricultural lands
1,063.6 10.33 354.5 9.09
betueen 24 and 50 has 517.4 3.02 172.5 4.42
TOTAL )10,293.6 100.00 3,901.3 100.00
a/
Philippine Coaaission for Good 6overnaeflt.
b/
Integrated Social Forestry.
Source: PARC (1989), Voluae 1.
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implemented in three phases; a breakdown by land types for each phase and the targeted 
number of beneficiaries is shown in Table 2. Three-fourths of the program’s area 
coverage is scheduled for Phase II; a large proportion of these lands are public A and D 
lands as well as upland areas covered by the Integrated Social Forestry (ISF) program of 
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The last lands to be 
reformed are medium-sized private-owned agricultural lands ranging from rive to SO ha, 
while the priority areas for reform are rice and com lands (lands covered under PD 27), 
idle and abandoned lands, foreclosed, and sequestered lands, and government-owned 
agricultural lands.
Retention L im it CARL endorses a variable retention limit For non-rice and 
non-com lands, the landowners can retain no more titan rive ha, with their heirs allowed 
to keep three ha each, provided that the heir is at least IS years old and is actually tilling 
or managing the land. The retention limit for rice and com lands is pegged at seven ha, 
the land ceiling stipulated in PD 27, while original homestead owners and their direct 
heirs are allowed to own and continue to cultivate their homestead lots which can be as 
large as 24 ha. Lastly, agrarian reform beneficiaries can own and cultivate as much as 
three ha.
Beneficiaries. Unlike in previous agrarian reform laws which limited die qualified 
beneficiaries to rice and com tenants and lessees, RA 66S7 includes all agricultural 
lessees and share tenants regardless of crops grown as well as regular, seasonal and other 
farmworkers, and farmers’ organizations or cooperatives. In addition to this list, other 
potential beneficiaries are agricultural graduates, rural women, veterans and relatives of 
enlisted men and women, retirees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the 
Integrated National Police, and rebel returnees and surrenderees.
Clearly, only a small portion of these intended beneficiaries would be able to avail of 
the reformed areas. Naturally, those belonging to the* middle- and high-income brackets 
and who have some political leverage in the villages, have more chances of acquiring the 
reformed lands than those who belong to the low-income rung and do not have or are not 
able to exert any political influence. For instance, agriculture graduates, rural-based and 
rich women, and retirees of the armed forces would most likely take advantage of and 
benefit from this policy measure to the detriment of the poor squatters on public lands, 
casual agricultural workers and poor peasants.
Non-Land Transfer and Deferment Programs. RA 6657 provides alternative 
schemes to agribusiness plantation owners which can effectively exempt them from land 
reform. These options are: (a) corporate stock sharing scheme, wherein farms may be 
exempted from reform so long as they convert their land values into stocks whose shares 
will be divested among its workforce; (b) land reform deferment scheme, wherein 
commercial farms devoted especially to livestock, poultry and swine raising, aquaculture, 
and the production of fruits, vegetables, cut flowers, cacao, coffee, and rubber,, can 
continue their production activities under the existing modes of land usage during the 10- 
year time frame of the law so long that these enterprises practice production- and 
profit-sharing; and (c) land use conversion, wherein the landowner requests for
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conversion of his land from an agricultural to a non-agricultural activity. Even 
foreign-operated agribusiness plantations have the option of operating either under the 
original terms of the contract during the 10-year time frame of the law or until the 
expiration of the said agreements even if the beneficiaries of the affected lands have 
already been identified and as long as these beneficiaries have not decided on the status of 
their lands.1® Lastly, public lands that will be open for agricultural purposes can be 
leased for as long as SO years so long as the lands are utilized for capital-intensive and 
export crop production and are within the 1,000-hectare limit specified in the 
Constitution.
Compensation and Mode of Payment to Landowners. Valuation of 
privately-owned agricultural lands will be.computed on its current market value. The law 
stipulates 10 indices for determining the landowners’ compensation. The most important 
of these factors are the production income, the sworn valuation by the owner, tax 
declaration, and the current value of the properties.17
The landowner may choose any of the following modes of compensation: (a) a 
combination of cash and government financial instruments; (b) shares of stocks in 
government-owned or controlled corporations, or Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) 
preferred shares, or of physical assets or other qualified investments; and (c) tax credits 
which can be used against any tax liability. Aside from these, landowners are given 
assistance and incentives to put the proceeds from their land sales to investment ventures 
in the country.
Payment by Beneficiaries. The beneficiary pays the LBP in 30 annual amortizations 
at 6.0 percent interest rate per annum. The beneficiary is forbidden by law to sell the land 
until the tenth year or until such time that he has fully paid his dues. The LBP serves as 
the mortgagor; failure by the beneficiary to pay an aggregate of three annual 
amortizations will mean a foreclosure in which LBP can award this foreclosed land to 
qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land has been foreclosed is permanently 
disqualified from becoming a CARP beneficiary.
Tenurial Arrangements. RA 6657 prohibits the practice of share tenancy. Instead, 
it promotes owner-cultivatorship especially in agrarian reform areas and direct 
administration through wage system in corporate and commercial farms. In tenanted 
lands not yet subjected to agrarian reform, landowners should shift to leasehold 
arrangements of a 75 to 25 sharing, with the larger share accruing to the farmer-tenant.
Political Machinery for Agrarian Reform Implementation. Unlike previous 
agrarian reform laws, CARL has established a political machinery that will (a) strengthen
16. This is the case of the pineapple plantations in Bukidnon and South Cotabato which are managed by Del Monte and 
Castle and Cooke, respectively. Since the Department of Agrarian Reform has not settled the lease arrangements 
between these companies and the cooperatives, both agribusiness companies are still in control of the plantations.
17. Examples of countries where small outgrowers schemes with multinational corporations have been implemented 
successfully are the pineapple contract arrangements in Thailand, the tea growers’ contracts in Kenya, and the 
banana-growing scheme practised by Stanfilco in the Philippines.
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the collaborative efforts among government agencies and synchronize their agrarian 
reform-related activities; (b) institutionalize grassroots participation in the implementation 
phase; and (c) hasten decision-making in agrarian reform-related issues.
Through RA 6657, various committees were established: (a) the Presidential Agrarian 
Reform Committee (PARC), chaired by the President herself with members comprising of 
the Secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Department of Agriculture 
(DA), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and other government 
agencies providing support services as well as representatives from the landlord and 
farmers’ sectors; (b) the Provincial Agrarian Reform Committee (PARCOM), made up of 
the governor, representative from CARP agencies, landlords and farmers; and (c) the 
Barangay Agrarian Reform Commit tee (BARC), presided by the barangay chairman with 
members from CARP agencies, landlords, and farmers.
Major Bottlenecks and Loopholes of CARL ,
Limited Coverage. A closer inspection of RAfS657’s coverage reveals that it is not 
as comprehensive as it'claims to lie. In terms of area coverage, it excludes a long list of 
land types which essentially constitute the “non-reform sector" (de Janvry 1981). In the 
context of this law, foe non-reform sector can he divided into categories: foe first 
comprises of areas used for non-profit activities whereas the second includes arable and 
privately-owned agricultural lands that are used for profit-oriented ventures. The first 
category consists of areas which are used for the provision of public goods (e.g., national 
defense) and services (e.g., education), those engaged in religious as well as research and 
developmental undertakings (e.g., experimental farms) and those reserved for ecological 
and environmental considerations (e.g., wildlife parks). Land types belonging to the 
second category include corporate/commercial farms which either practice corporate 
stock sharing or are collectively owned by its workers, non-tenanted rice and com lands 
whose sizes are seven ha and below, other croplands whose areas are equal to or less than 
five ha, and homestead lands.
It is estimated that about 16.7 million ha belong to the first category of the non-reform 
sector, a breakdown of which is shown in Table 3. While it can be argued that these land 
uses are socially beneficial to the country in general to warrant their exemption from land 
reform, their unconditional exclusion ensures evasionary mechanisms for the landlord 
bloc and provides a venue for plantation agriculture. For example, several land lords in 
Mindanao converted their landholdings into "non-profit" ventures in order to avoid land 
distribution (Quisumbing and Adriano 1989). Likewise, TADECO, a large banana 
plantation in this island, is automatically exempted from reform since 4,000 ha of its lands 
are leased from a penal colony (Quisumbing and Adriuano 1989). Moreover, public and 
private research centers should operate within the size range stipulated by the retention 
limit to stimulate the development of technologies appropriate to small-scale farming.
A World Bank study (1979) estimates that (a) the exclusion of agricultural lands with 
18 percent slope would reduce the total arable lands to a mere 12 percent, considering that 
the terrain of the country is generally rolling; and that (b) an inclusion of potentially 
arable lands with slopes greater than 18 percent would expand the potential arable land
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Table 3
Distribution of Public and Private Lands Exeapted froa RA 6657
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by one-fourth. Although the percentages may be grossly overestimated, the fact remains 
that the potential land for redistribution would be substantially reduced when such a 
criterion is used. Many cases especially in Mindanao abound where such lands have been 
extensively used for cattle-grazing; their conversion into viable small farms operated by 
upland squatters, would now be highly improbable by virtue of RA 6657 which excludes 
18 percent sloped areas.
As illustrated in Table 3, potential land available for reform is four million ha. This 
total reform area, however, may still be reduced to an insignificantly smaller figure 
considering that the direct households of farm-owners can allocate lands for themselves 
and that corporate farms can resort to corporate sharing as a mechanism for exempting 
their farm from this redistributive measure.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, evasion per se would not be extremely difficult 
even for an average landowner since RA 6657 is riddled with numerous qualifying 
conditions. By legislating a long and complicated transition phase for its implementation, 
the law has provided the landlord group enough time to develop evasionary strategies that 
will assure their property rights. Likewise, the complicated design of the timetable itself 
would serve as a major stumbling block for the inadequately financed and understaffed 
government in interpreting and effectively implementing land reform especially in 
corporate and commercial farms controlled by local and foreign agribusiness entities. A 
long transition phase would also induce rent-seeking activities especially in the local 
governments.
Not only would the area of agricultural lands that will be left for reform be 
significantly reduced as a result of the clauses on exemptions but the law would also have 
an effect on the quality of lands that will be placed ultimately under the reform sector. In 
particular, since this law allows the landowners to choose the lands that they shall keep, 
these landowners would naturally select lands with superior quality, are strategically 
located to the markets, and have direct or easy access to physical infrastructure such as 
irrigation facilities. Moreover, since the enforcement of this law shall be 4one in stages, 
this allows the landowners time to decapitalize the areas that shall be expropriated and 
capitalize their reserved lands, thereby increasing substantially the capital-labor ratios in 
the latter sites.
In brief, one can safely conclude that lands under the reform sector of CARL will be 
marginal, low-quality lands with limited access to effective demand as well as to 
production and marketing infrastructure. Without the adequate provision of appropriate 
support services for the qualified beneficiaries of these lands, one would expect a high 
probability of abandonment in the reform sector and a reconsolidation of these lands to 
their original or even new landowners.
The Issue of Single Versus Variable Retention Limit and Award Ceiling. Apart 
from the large land area for corporate and commercial farms which can be exempted from 
the law, RA 6657 purports that in agrarian reformed areas, the landownership structure 
could have variable land sizes, ranging between three and seven ha. However, as argued 
by Quisumbing and Adriano (1988), a single retention limit for all croplands is a more
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effective and equitable strategy than one which stipulates various land ceilings. From the 
government standpoint, a single retention limit for all croplands would make the 
administration and implementation of the program substantially easier and less costly in 
terms of reducing both evasionary tactics and the scope for rent-seeking activities by 
government personnel. Moreover, the provision which allows the landowners to reserve 
three ha for their legal heirs defeats the redistributive intention of agrarian reform. This 
provision would enable the landowners to exempt a major portion if not all of their 
landholdings.
For equity considerations, the smaller the landownership ceiling, the better. First, the 
lower the landownership ceiling, the higher the number of beneficiaries that the program 
will be able to cover (Ledesma 1987). Second, not only will the program be able to cover 
more farmers but the provision of support services in the countryside will be more evenly 
distributed in terms of clientele and thus will not be concentrated in favor of large 
landowners and agro-enterprises. Lastly, a stipulation of a low land ceiling does not 
necessarily preclude the operation of large-scale farms as the establishment of 
cooperatives, contract-farming, and collective ownership of lands is not discouraged.
Non-land Transfer and Priority Areas: Provisions Favoring Agribusiness 
Corporations. RA 6657 has also stipulated qualifying conditions which would either 
exempt agribusiness plantations from land reform or would delay considerably the 
implementation of this measure on corporate and commercial farms. Among the 
provisions contributory to these purposes were: (a) non-land transfer through corporate 
stock sharing; (b) the land reform deferment scheme on new commercial farms; (c) the 
unclear mechanics for identifying the beneficiaries in commercial and corporate farms; 
(d) the establishment of profit-sharing schemes; (e) vague land use conversion guidelines; 
and (f) a step-wise and 10-year time frame for implementation.
The preferential treatment accorded to agribusiness plantations by these provisions 
should be contrasted with the provisions affecting private lands belonging to the 
50-hectare and above category and which are not classified as corporate or commercial 
farms. These farms are within priority two in the step-wise implementation of land 
reform. Considering that the preferred modes of labor arrangements in RA 6657 are 
owner-cultivatorship and direct administration, one clearly sees that the objective of these 
combined provisions is to eradicate feudal modes and relations of productions epitomized 
by haciendas and tenanted estates and replace these instead with agribusiness plantations.
The underlying premise of these provisions is grounded on the belief that economies 
of scale in farm production, processing and marketing of export cash crops exist. This 
premise, however, is ill-conceived. In the two surveys conducted by Hayami, 
Quisumbing and Adriano (1987a, 1987b), they found out that production and marketing 
for most tree crops such as coconut, coffee, cacao, and rubber require neither large-scale 
machinery nor central management, both of which could be possible sources of scale 
economies. These studies further contend that while some scale economies in farm 
production arise as a result of the employment of capital equipment and some 
crop-specific infrastructure, there is no reason to believe that the provision for the use of
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these factors of production is possible only within the organizational set-up of the 
plantation enterprise. Small growers can achieve an efficiency comparable to that of large 
plantations so long as they can have access to these resources made possible through the 
establishment of rental markets for the use of farm machineries and crop-specific 
infrastructure.
A genuine source of scale economies appears to lie in the need for close coordination 
between production and processing/marketing especially for perishable commodities, to 
meet the stringent quality specifications of the overseas market. Another important source 
of scale economies is the strict need for pest and disease control. In both instances, a 
centrally-managed plantation system seems to have a great advantage in ensuring the 
timely collection of a large quantity of highly perishable commodities for shipment to 
foreign markets. However, the disadvantage of small farms in these regards can be 
overcome through the development of appropriate organizational set-ups and marketing 
arrangements such as contract farming. Several country cases^ have illustrated that 
contract-growing arrangements between small farmers and local or multinational 
processing/marketing companies can be a viable mode of operation. Under this system, 
farm production is relegated to a number of small independent growers whose 
landholdings form contiguous large-sized operational farms, while domestic and foreign 
agro-corporations concentrate on the processing and marketing aspects. The latter 
observation highlights the fact that large operational holdings do not necessarily require 
ownership of vast tracts of lands. Indeed, various mechanisms can be designed that can 
consolidate small farmholdings into contiguous large-sized operational farms. Contract 
farming is one mechanism while lease contracts with small landowners is yet another 
alternative.
Co-existence of Two Modes of Productive Organizations. RA 6657 thus seems to 
promote the coexistence of two extreme modes of agrarian structures, i.e., small farms 
producing food and other cash crops, on one hand, and large-sized agribusiness-operated 
farms cultivating essentially export crops, on the other. Small-sized farms, especially in 
the grains crop subsector, will be developed partly because their existence is especially 
important during the initial stages of growth in ensuring cheap labor and low-priced wage 
goods for both the plantations and industry,19 and partly due to the fact that their presence 
serves as a political concession for resolving the problem of rural unrest. While staple 
crop production may be suited to small-sized farm units, the design of CARL presumes 
that export crop production, a major source of foreign exchange earnings of the country, 
is best produced in large-sized farms which enjoy economies of scale arising from the 
employment of capital-intensive methods of production. It is on the basis of this premise 
that large-sized agribusiness-run farms are preferred to the haciendas and tenanted farms. 
Since the former types of farms invest and employ large amounts of capital in their farms
18. This is in sharp contrast with PD 27’s land valuation which uses only a multiple of average annual productivity.
19. The plantation owners would benefit from the existence of small farms since the latter ensures for the large farms a 
reserve army of cheap labor, or what Harris (1982) called "disguised proletarians." Thus, the small farms provide the 
household owners a portion of their subsistence and production requirements while their wage earnings from the 
plantations fill the financial gap.
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(,hacienda owners use their profits largely for consumption and not for production 
expenditures),20 then it would be economically advantageous for the countryside to 
minimize the redistributive effects of the reform on these agribusiness plantations.
RA 6657 thus pmports a selective redistributive scheme wherein it will expropriate 
and redistribute large lands cultivating staple crops as well as feudalistic agrarian 
structures but will not touch capitalist farm enterprises. It was not designed to bring about 
inter-rural equalization by homogenizing the land ownership structure in this sector, but 
rather, was aimed at inducing the establishment of profit-motivated agribusiness 
plantations supported at the periphery by small-sized farms which supply the former 
enterprises with cheap labor.
Promoting a bi-modal agrarian structure has implications on equity and efficiency. 
First, the co-existence of large and small-sized farms would severely limit the impact of 
agrarian reforms in achieving equity. With skewed landownership distribution being a 
major source of inequality in the country (Quisumbing 1986), an agrarian reform that 
does not ensure a more homogenous landownership structure would only aggravate the 
problem of inequality.
Second, a bi-modal agrarian structure is an inefficient organizational arrangement for 
a country characterized by a highly inelastic land supply. Large-sized farms tend to 
exploit this scarce resource extensively and employ more capital - another scarce factor of 
production in the country - intensively. In contrast, small-sized farms cultivate land more 
intensively and employ more labor, an abundant resource in the country (Chayanov 
1966).
Lastly, a bi-modal agrarian structure has implications on the nature and pace of the 
country’s development Like in the Marcos regime, this mode of productive organization 
presumes that agribusiness plantations can serve as the engines for rural growth. But, as 
the country has experienced, such a growth-bias is not based on the efficient allocation 
and use of the country’s resources and is not accompanied by a more equitable income 
structure. The growth prospect employing this strategy is limited because it does not 
develop a broad domestic base for the plantation’s produce and is not sustainable because 
resources are mismanaged (Adelman 1984).
The Inefficiency and Inequality Arguments of Tenancy Regulation. CARL 
presumes that the first-best contracts are the owner-operator type and the direct 
administration through wage system. However, recent theoretical and empirical studies 
on share tenancy have concluded that this form of land contract is as efficient as the 
leasehold contract and owner-operatorship (e.g., Cheung 1969; Newbeny 1977; Reid, 
Otsuka and Hayami 1988). Moreover, due to imperfect or incomplete markets in 
agriculture especially in land, labor, non-tradable inputs (e.g., draft power), credit, 
insurance, and technology, enforcement and transaction costs become exorbitantly high
20. For a more comprehensive comparison of haciendas and agribusiness plantations, refer to Quisumbing and Adriano 
(1988a).
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providing an incentive to "internalize" particular institutional arrangements which 
effectively link these incomplete markets.21 Sharecropping arrangements have been 
shown as appropriate mechanisms for reducing the enforcement and transactions costs 
due to the imper fections in the market (e.g., Braverman and Svinivasan 1981) and for 
sharing the risks stemming largely from the uncertainty of crop production (e.g., Kowal 
1985).
A tenancy regulation may also aggravate the problem of inequality. Using the 
"agricultural ladder" concept (Spillman 1919), a regulation prohibiting share tenancy 
wiil prevent the majority of the landless workers from improving their 
income/occupational status.
Recent empirical works on land contracts (e.g., Hayami 1989; Otsuka 1989) illustrate 
the tenacity of share tenancy arrangements despite the legal prohibitions. Where transfer 
of landownership rights and the practice of share tenancy are prevented by the agrarian 
reform measure, new institutional arrangements emerge which operate like share tenancy 
contracts except that the agrarian reform beneficiary mortgages his land cultivation rights. 
Illicit sub-tenancy arrangements also evolve under the guise of direct administration 
system. In these arrangements, the traditional landlord role is replaced by rural traders, 
millers, middle class rural dwellers, and several agrarian reform beneficiaries who have 
opted for non-agricultural activities.
What these findings imply is that with the imperfections in the various rural markets, 
rural producers will contract institutional arrangements whose benefits to the parties more 
than outweigh the potential penalty costs from circumventing the legal structures.
Gainers and Losers of CARL. The previous sections have shown that the design of 
CARL was strongly influenced by a new breed of landowners, essentially composed of 
corporate and commercial farmowners. The law is full of compromises and concessions 
favoring this group, to the detriment of traditional landowners who generate their income 
largely through the extraction of rent. It should be emphasized, however, that CARL was 
also designed to accommodate renter-landowners so long as the latter transformed their 
tenant-based arrangements to either owner-cultivatorship or direct administration 
arrangements or change the mode of land use from agricultural to non-agricultural 
activities.
Another political force accorded preferential treatment in this law is the rural middle 
class. Doronila (1988) identifies this faction as the propertied group in the countryside 
whose landholdings are typically below 24 ha and whose occupations range from civil 
servants (e.g., teachers and military officers) to local politicians, traders and millers. In 
terms of number and degree of influence in village-level politics, the members of this 
class are far more numerous than the big landowners and have political leverage in rural 
towns and villages.
21. Braverman and Srinivasan (1981) define interlinkages as "contracts between the same pair of individuals relating 
exchanges in more than community or service, the contracts being linked in the essential way ... (any) delinking of 
contracts would be infeasible or costly for one party... (thus), linking may constitute a Pareto superior move as opposed 
to a delinked situation..."
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it was for these reasons that this class has benefitted from the agrarian reform law as 
their farms shall be covered last by the reform. The list of agrarian beneficiaries also 
applies to this group as most of them reside in the countryside and manage their farms 
either directly of indirectly. More importantly, the political influence and economic 
capability of this class will further enhance their chances of benefitting from this reform 
measure especially in the present political environment of inefficient government 
bureaucracy and a law riddled with loopholes.
Agriculture lessees and share tenants, the priority beneficiaries of this reform, would 
likewise benefit from the implementation of CARL. However, their chances of capturing 
the larger share of the reformed area will highly depend on their capability to organize 
and mobilize their sector into a strong countervailing force vis-a-vis the interests of the 
propertied bloc.
Finally, the main losers in this agrarian reform law are the landless rural workers who 
have neither farms to rent for their own cultivation nor permanent employment in 
plantations. It is most likely that their lot will worsen relative to other potential 
beneficiaries of this reform.
This only highlights the fact that land reform is not and cannot be the end-solution to 
rural poverty and inequality. For this reform measure to be effective in equalizing 
incomes and alleviating poverty, a comprehensive approach to countryside employment 
should be developed precisely to absorb this surplus labor (Balisacan 1990).
Cumbersome Land Valuation. Another provision that is vulnerable to the 
evasionary tactics of the landowners and enhances government employees’ rent-seeking 
activities is the definition of just compensation to the landowners. As mentioned above, 
the Act specifies 10 factors for considering just landowners’ compensation. The inclusion 
of these factors, some of which are difficult to quantify, would further delay the 
distribution of lands.
The government is not lacking in terms of recommendations which will simplify the 
formula and appease landowners’ dissatisfaction over the low land values when the 
formula is applied. Worth noting is the alternative formula suggested by Justice Santiago, 
a representative of the landowner bloc. Expectedly, his formula will result to higher land 
values than those proposed by the government but a shade lower than resulting values 
from PD 27’s formula. What is significant about this recommendation is that it 
approximates a leasehold arrangement, is much simpler and more transparent than the 
government’s original and more recent (AO No. 3 amending the previous formula) 
formula, and more importantly, is a suggestion acceptable to the landowners’ group. 
Unfortunately, the government did not adopt this recommendation, ultimately losing its 
opportunity to gain momentum in the implementation of this measure.
Another major bottleneck is the large disparity between the huge disbursement of 
funds as payment to landowners and the low land revenues that will be generated from the 
beneficiaries. This financial imbalance is aggravated by the fact that agriculture land 
markets are prohibited by RA 6657; this only means that land cannot serve as an
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investment collateral especially for banking transactions. Both factors may have grave 
implications on the government’s scheduled cap on public deficit which, in turn, can 
offset the macroeconomic environment.
Conclusion. Having reviewed RA 6657, it is apparent that the selective redistributive 
scheme of this law may aggravate the already inequitable landownership structure. With 
large tracts of land remaining under the control of a few but powerful propertied class, the 
remaining reformed areas will most likely be accessed by the rural middle class. The vast 
majority, comprising of the agricultural share tenants, lessees and the landless rural 
workers, will have less chances of obtaining quality agricultural lands unless they 
organize and establish a strong countervailing force or a more egalitarian land reform 
replaces the present measure.
Under RA 6657, agricultural output will be increased largely through the activities of 
agribusiness plantations. This is premised on the belief that economies of scale in farm 
production exist. However, as discussed earlier, there may be no scale economies in farm 
production. Indeed, continued reliance on plantation-type of farms may be inefficient for 
the economy because these modes of productive organizations are inefficient users of our 
scarce (i.e., land and capital) and abundant (labor) resources.
The plantation-bias of CARL presumes that the marketable surplus will be efficiently 
generated and sustained by these modes of productive organization. While a marketable 
surplus can in fact be extracted from this sector like in the past, it is doubtful whether the 
surplus extraction can be sustained without developing a broad domestic market base. 
Adelman (1984) and Ranis, Stewart and Reyes (1989) argue that unless a broad domestic 
market base is created in the countryside, agriculture’s capacity to finance the initial 
stages of industrialization will be severely restrained. They contend further that a more 
egalita rian landownership structure will provide the impetus for an increase in income in 
the countryside which in turn can initiate the development of rural-based industries, the 
embryonic stage of industrialization.
Lastly, from the discussion of the gainers and losers of RA 6657, this measure is 
similar to the previous agrarian reform programs for its passage was a short-term solution 
for diffusing peasant unrest and appeasing the popular clamor for an agrarian reform. The 
architects of the law are still the propertied class, except that the dominant players are the 
domestic agribusiness plantation owners. The design of this Act also reveals an alliance 
of the propertied group with the rural middle class, a dominant sector in village-based 
politics.
Because RA 6657 falls short of achieving a more egalitarian and efficient 
landownership structure, the peasant sector under the aegis of the Congress for People’s 
Agrarian Reform (CPAR) has formulated an alternative agrarian reform measure. Before 
examining this measure, let us briefly examine the response of Congress after the passage 
of RA 6657.
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Response o f Congress to RA 6657
Since the signing of RA 6657 into law on 10 June 1988, some members of the lower 
and the Upper Houses have initiated moves that will further dilute the already 
watered-down comprehensiveness of CARL (Table 4). At present, there are as many as 
53 pending bills and resolutions in the two Chambers. The bulk of the amendments aim 
at limiting the coverage of land reform, particularly either in farming activities perceived 
as enjoying economies of scale or in areas proposed for non-agricultural activities.
Aside from these, various landowners have used the legal venues to strengthen their 
position. A clear victory was the en banc decision of the Supreme Court dated 07 March 
1991 (Luz Farms vs. Secretary o f the DAR) which essentially exempts some 400,000 ha 
of agricultural land devoted to livestock and poultry from land reform. Another was the 
Department of Justice opinion in 1990 exempting agricultural lands designated as non- 
agricultural in the town zoning maps developed prior to 15 June 1988, the date when 
CARL was put into effectivity. And the third was the Supreme Court ruling that 
agriculture lands cannot be distributed unless the landowners are fully paid.
Similarly, the Government has vacillated on its commitments to CARL. The most 
recent proof of this faltering commitment was shown when a large amount of the agrarian 
reform fund was diverted to a livelihood project of one of the local governments. Even 
the government’s approach to industrialization, as amply illustrated by the indiscriminate 
land conversions, directly clashes with the goals of the reform measure.
What these examples illustrate is that landowners, with their political and economic 
influence, are rapidly consolidating their forces and increasing their bargaining leverage 
vis-a-vis the prospective beneficiaries. The interests of this group have been bolstered 
further b;<> the lack of political commitment of the government and the many loopholes for 
evasion in the law.
RA 6657 Versus PARCODE: Which One Is More Comprehensive?
Immediately after the passage of RA 6657 into law on 10 June 1988, the Congress for 
a People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR), the umbrella coalition of 12 large peasant 
organizations, drafted an alternative agrarian reform measure called the People’s Agrarian 
Reform Code (PARCODE). In a multi-sectoral conference held three weeks after RA 
6657 was signed into law, the PARCODE was unanimously approved by a broad 
spectrum of peasant organizations, sectoral and cause-oriented groups, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other political alliances. CPAR to date is gathering three 
million voter signatures in favor of PARCODE in line with the Constitutional provision 
allowing for people’s legislative initiatives.
This section compares RA 6657 with PARCODE determining in the process (a) the 
objectives prioritized by these reform measures; and (b) the nature of transition 
envisioned by both measures. It is hoped that after this examination, one can identify 
which of these measures is indeed more comprehensive.
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Table 4





I. Lower House 
A. Bills
1) HB 889 - expropriation of land froe the Musa
estate in Davao del Sur for the relo­
cation of poor and landless fishereen 
and faraers
tabled (covered by 
R.A. 6857)
2) HB 16343 - exeaption froe CARP qf all ancestrally- 
claiaed and titled lands occupied and 
cultivated by aeabers of the National 
Cultural Coaaunities
request for joint referral 
(with the Coaaittee on 
National Cultural Coaauni- 
ties)
3) HB 30626 - exeqption froa CARP of all lands culti­
vated by religious associations living 
and working together in coaaunities
pending in the AR 
coaaittee
4) HB 16211 - exception froa the coaaercial farcing 
classification in the CARP all lands 
devoted to livestock, poultry and saine 
raising and aquaculture (salt beds, fish­
ponds and prawn ponds)
pending in the AR 
coaaittee
3) HB 17773 - exeaption froa CARP of coaaercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising, 
aquaculture, including saltbeds, fish­
ponds and prawn fares
6) HB 18922 - exclusion froa CARP of all lands devoted
to poultry, swine and cattle production
7) HB 17278 - provision of a production sharing
scheae based on 'net* incoae 
production for fara-workers, 
aanagers, supervisors and technicians 
engaged in all livestock and poultry 
businesses using less than five (3) ha 
of land
pending in the AR 
coaaittee
pending in the AR 
coaaittee
pending in the AR 
coaaittee
8) HB 23472 - exception froa CARP of all dairy fares, 
fishponds and all lands devoted to 
fruit trees, coffee, cacao, coconut, 
papaya, aango, durian, guyabano, 
bananas, aacadaaia nuts, pili nuts 
and cashews
pending in the AR 
coaaittee






9) HB 23559 -
10) HB 24910 -
11) HB 31315 -
12) HB 327B3 -
13) HB 33021 -
14) HB 32191 -
15) HB 17731 -
lb) HB 21610 -
Subject Statue
exception froe CARP of private land! pending in the AR
with IB percent slope gradient provided coeeittee
that these lands be devoted to industrial 
and fruit tree plantations
exception froe CARP of all lands pending in the AR
identified by the Metropolitan coeeittee
Manila zoning ordinance or
Municipal or City Coeprehensive
Developaent Plans as coeeercial,
industrial or residential areas
exclusion froa CARP of all lands pending in the AR
eith a declared earket value of coaaittee
P30 or aore per square aeter 
as of Tune 19B7
exclusion froa CARP of all lands pending in the AR
with a declared aarket value of coaaittee
P10 or aore
provision of a six year aoratoriua pending in the AR
starting January 1, 1991 of CARP coaaittee
iapleaentation on all agricultural 
lands devoted to sugar cane
provision allowing the iaaediate pending in the AR
reclassification of forest lands coaaittec
no longer suitable for forestry 
into agricultural lands
repulsion of PD 717 as aaended pending in the AR
because of its failure to ins- coaaittee
titutionalize an agrarian refora 
credit and financing systea
provision of balanced represent- pending in the AR
ation of beneficiaries and land coanittee
owners in the iapleaentation of CARP 
by equalizing the nuaber of repre­
sentation frDB each group in the 
PARC, identifying the aeabers of 





17) HB 21 W O  - appropriation of 50 percent of the 
proceeds froe the diepoeition of 
propertiee of the governoent in Japan 
to Ml II Filipino Veterans thereby 
aoending sect 63 sub-section C of CARP 
which directs all disposition proceeds 
froe all countries to financing the CARP
pending in the AR 
coeoittee
18) HB 25911 - addition of a paragraph in the land 
conversion provision in the CARP for 
cases where no tenant is affected) in such 
cases, the city or eunicipal council aay 
authorize the reclassification or con­
version of the land and its disposition 
subject to existing laws
pending in the AR 
coooittee
19) HB 26561 - prescription of conditions for land 
conversion fro* agricultural to non- 
agricultural uses
pending in the AR 
coooittee
20) HB 27470 - declaration of the State's policies of 
proeoting investsents and renewed cor­
porate activities under CARP by allowing 
corporations and associations foroed after 
the effectivity of CARP to avail of stock 
transfers and distribution or stock option 
plans
pending in the AR 
coooittee
21) HB 27673 - revision of the CARP to assure the peneing in the ak
pSyaent and just coepensation of landowners coeaitte*
22) HB 277331 - redefinition of the CARP objectives pending in the AR
cosoittee
23) HB 2B033 - provision for retention lieits and
prorities in the distribution of agri­
cultural lands
pending in the AR 
coeoittee
24) HB 28277 - aoending CARP by proposing to base re­
tention lioits on the land's econooic 
viability
pending in the AR 
coooittee
25) HB 28279 - provision for a basis for deteroining the 
landowner's just coopensation and pres­
cription of a corresponding node of 
coapensation






26) HB 284o3 - proviiion of unconditional grants and 
aid* for support of agrarian rafora
pending in the AR 
coanittee
27) HB 28803 - protection of a corporate shareholder's 
right of retention to his agricultural 
land
pending in the AR 
coaeittee
28) ;:B 31557 - cancellation of stock transfer ounership 
as a code of transferring Hand ounership 
to fareer-beneficiaries
pending in the AR 
coaeittee
29) HB 33232 - increasing the consideration for the lease 
of tenanted lands and lands not devoted to 
rice fareing (and thus not yet covered by 
CARP) froe 23 to 50 percent of the 
average noreal harvest of three agricultural 
years ieeediately preceding the date leasehold 
uas established
30) HB 33631 - definition of the pouers and functions of 
the PARCDH in order to strengthen its 
capacity to carry out the CARP
8. Resolutions
1) HR 1893 - Urges the Land Hanageaent Bureau of the 
DEHR and the BAR to act ieoediately on 
claies of various settler groups in 
Davao
2) HR 776 - Urges the Louer House Agrarian Refore 
Coeeittee to probe expansion of Del Honte 
in Bukidnon in possible violation of the 
CARP
3) HR 853 - requests the Office of the President 
to organize a study group uhich would 
quantify the resources/inputs needed for 
the CARP, the purpose of uhich is to 
identify the eanufacturing facilities that 
the private sector has to establish
pending in the AR 
coaaittee
4) HR 915 - proposes the indefinite suspension of 
CARP relative to the livestock and 
poultry raising enterprises






5) HR 992 - requests the investigation of anoaalous 
issuance of doarance peroitt for the 
establishaent of resettleaent area*
pending on the AR 
coaaittee
M  HR 1022 - requests the Louer House Coaaittees on 
Agrarian Refore and on Agriculture and 
Food to report on the agricultural and 
agrarian refore credit policy ai estab­
lished under PD 717
pending on the AR 
coaaittee
7) HR 1082 - proposes the suspension of CARP iaple- 
nentation on connercial livestock fares
pending on the AR 
coaaittee
8) HR 1324 - requests the revieu of all land purchases 
and transactions of the DAR in iapleaen- 
ting the CARP
pending on the AR 
coaaittee
9) HR 1029 ^ requests an inquiry by the Lower House 
Agrarian Refora Cooaittee on the indis- 
crieinate conversion of fertile agricul­
tural lands into residential, coonercial 
or industrial zones
pending on the AR 
coaaittee
10) HR 1215 - requests Lower House coneittM on 
agrarian refore to probe the retrench- 
nent of 952 TADEC0 workers in the light 
of its ioplication on the CARP
pending on the AR 
coaaittee
11) HR 1502 - requests that landowners be given 
priority to negotiate with the Asset 
Privatization Trust as a seasure to 
accelerate Land Acquisition
pending on the AR 
coaaittee
12) HR 1M0 - requests a study on the natter of the 
conversion of agricultural lands into 
residential, coeenrcial and industrial 
lands
pending on the AR 
coaaittee
13) HR 1M2 - requests that the Lower House Coaeittees 
on Econoeic Affairs, Agrarian Refora, 
Agriculture, Natural Resources and 
Environaent, and Urban Developeent to 
draw up a National Land Use policy of the 
governnent for the purpose of balancing 
land use for residential, coaaercial, 
industrial, agricultural and aangroves 
purposes







14) HR'1687 - calls for a bicaaeral study group the pending on the AR
purpose of uhich is to introduce aaend- coaaittee
aents to the CARP
IS) HR 1863 - calls for an inquiry into the loan policies pending on the AR
of banting and other financial institu­
tions specifically those aith regards 
to cooperative and agricultural develop­
ment financing
coaaittee
16) HR 2056 - urges PARC to assign DAR the exclusive 
authority regarding land acquisition and 
distribution as provided by the CARP
pending on the AR
coaaittee
II. Upper House
1) SB 1157 - requires that governaent banking and pending on the AR
lending institution to grant the DAR the conaittee 
right of first refusal before any fore­
closed property classified as agricultural 
land is offered for sale to the public, 
provided that DAR, upon acquisition of 
the land shall redistribute it under the 
provisions of CARP
2) SB 1127 - requires that all proposed agricultural pending on the AR
land acquisitions of the DAR tor iaple- coaaittee
aenting the CARP be published in a news­
paper of general circulation for the 
purpose of transparency and public 
scrutiny
3) SB 1412 - repeals the 5 year experience require- pending on the AR
sent of any Agrarian Refora Secretary or coaaittee
Undersecretary as required in Section 50 
Article I, Chapter III of Republic Act 
3844, as aaended
4) SB 1221 - introduces for the purpose of streng- pending on the AR
thening CARP several changes such co*aittee
as (1) PARC approval of land acquisition 
aaounting to greater than P10 H, 








to carry the signature of both the OAR 
Secretary and IBP President) and several 
new provisions regarding (1) publications 
of DAR land acquisition, and (2) inclusion 
of the Provincial Auditor and a COA repre­
sentative in the PARCOH and the Compensation 
Clearing Coaaittee (CCC), respectively
5) SB 1415 - seeks to except coaaercial livestock, 
poultry, and swine raising faras froa 
the coverage of CARP
pending on the AR
coaaittee
4) SB 1440 - regulates the cutting of coconut trees 
and the conversion of coconut faras into 
other agricultural uses, and tor other 
purposes
for 2nd reading pending on 
the AR coaaittee
7) SB 450 - proposes to except saall fares, 50 ha 
or less froa the coverage of the CARP
pending on the AR 
coaaittee
=zi=s35srssssfCSsix39ss<Eti«3naiuKzns>KP«isBiz»nstm«tasKdia»iBitiiS8am*m*iH«BX>tifc
Source: Coaaittee on Agrarian Refora, House of Representatives, Republic of the Philippines.
Coaaittee on Agrarian Before and Rural Development, Senate of the Republic of the Philippines.
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A Comparison of Land Reform Components. Table 5 compares the land reform 
coverage of both measures. While the two measures cover public and private agricultural 
lands regardless of tenurial arrangements and crops grown, CARL includes a long list of 
exempted or non-reform areas and alternative schemes that can serve as substitutes to land 
distribution. It is interesting to note that majority of the land types exempted from land 
reform in CARL are included in the PARCODE’s reformed areas. Thus, in terms of area 
coverage, PARCODE is more comprehensive. Also, since it does not provide alternative 
schemes to land distribution, PARCODE lessens the possible evasionary venues available 
to present landowners.
The proposed agrarian reform program is superior to RA 6657 on four other aspects. 
First, it proposes a single retention limit which is likewise the award ceiling to agrarian 
reform beneficiaries. Further, it stipulates that the prospective beneficiaries acquire 
quality or prime lands, thereby enhancing their opportunity to increase yields; this is 
crucial especially during the initial years of the reform period. Third, it favors a shorter 
time period for land reform implementation; as shall be mentioned in succeeding sections, 
countries wherein agrarian reform was successfully implemented completed the reform in 
a short time frame. And lastly, it is more flexible for unlike RA 6657 which stipulates a 
step-wise implementation schedule, PARCODE leaves the determination of the priority 
areas to the agrarian reform committees.
If implemented according to plan, PARCODE’s land reform program will ensure a 
more egalitarian landownership structure. Moreover, since it is premised on the 
development of small-sized farms, it will assure the economy of a more efficient 
allocation of the country’s resources.
The major bottleneck for PARCODE is the political resistance from the landowners, 
especially the rural middle class. Its chances of implementation would have been greater 
if it were accomplished during the initial years of the Aquino Administration when the 
landowners were more conciliatory to the idea of land reform. Today, however, 
landowners are more organized, are more entrenched in the political and economic 
landscape, and hence, have mustered more political and economic leverage.
Comparison of Provisions Affecting the Landowners. Table 6 compares the two 
agrarian reform measures in terms of landowners’ compensation. While both will pay the 
landowners a remuneration using fair market value as a basis for valuing land, the two 
differ in the factors that will be employed. The long list of qualitative factors in these two 
reform measures can be the source of delaying payments and hence, serve as a basis for 
building discontentment among the landowners.
A most noticeable difference between the two measures consists of favorable terms 
accorded to the landowners under RA 6657. Specifically, the landowners will be fully 
compensated, with the mode of payment ensuring attractive future values for their lost 
property. Aside from this, the government shall assist the landowners in identifying 




A Comparison of RA 6657 and PARCODE by Land Refora Coaponenti
MMnunnu«a«uzMKNKMnnanwUMzsaMKnnJsssnnauMnmsn
RA 6657 PARCODE
Coverage All private agricultural lands
regardless of crops groan and 
tenurial arrangements
Idle and abandoned, foreclosed 
and sequestered lands
Governnent-omed agricultural lands
A I D  agricultural lands
Public agricultural lands 
under agro-bated, pasture, 
leases
All private agricultural 
lands, regardless of crops 
groun and tenurial arrangements
Connercia1 farns such as 
piggery, poultry, livestock, etc
Arable public lands ano neuly 
acquired and red ained areas
Logging areas
Thickly-populated national parks 
Pasture areas
Idle and abandoned, foreclosed 
and sequestered lands





All water and fishing 
resources (inland, coastal and 
offshore fishing areas)
Mangroves, marshlands suitable 
for fishing, fisponds, legal 
and illegal fishpens, pram
faros, salt beds and coastal 
lands
All lands and nater resources 
effectively under the control 
of US nilitary bases
All other agricultural lands
Table 5 (Continuation)
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RA bb57 PARCODE
Those iaaediately converted 
to non-agricultural uset
Exeaptiont Parka, wildlife, foreat reaervea,
reforeatation, fiah aanctuariea, 
and breeding grounda, uateraheda 
and aagrovea, national defenae, 
school aitea and caapuaea, 
experiaental fara atationa of 
public and private achoola, 
research and production centers, 
churches and convents, aosque 
sites and Islaaic centers, 
coaaunal burying grounds and 
ceaeteries, penal colonies and 
penal faras, government and 
private research and quarantine 
centers, 18 percent sloped lands, 
ancestral lands
- none -
Non-land Corporate stock sharing
transfer Request/approval for land use
scheaes Conversion
Land refora deferaent scheae of 
up to 10 years for coaaercial 
faras engaged in livestock, 
poultry and swine raising, aqua­
culture, saltbeds, fishponds and 
prawn ponds, fruit faras, orchards, 
vegetables and cutflowers, 
cacao coffee and rubber
- none -
HNCs Acquisition and distribution of 
public lands under lease, aanage- 
aent, or grower's contract with 
HNCs in excess of 1,000 ha 
within 3 years froa date of law
Continue of land contracts 
for 2 years froa date of 
law, after which for acqui­
sition and distribution 
including iaproveaents in land
HNC - controlled public lands 
within hectaraage liait can operas 
until 8/29/92; beyond that for 
distribution of lands excluding 
iaproveaents
Land contracts for public lands 









im m n a c a im r tn n m n « i
RA 4457
Conpulsory acquisition/distribution 
of private-owned lands under land 
contracts with HNCs after Id 
years
Seven ha for rice and cor* laodt 
Five ha for other croplands 
Up to 24 ha for hseestead 
lands
No lisit for fare under 
corporate stock sharing 
1,000 ha Unit for public 
lands leased by governont 
to cospanies and 300 ha if 
individuals
Three ha each for legal heirs 
of landouner
Landowners uith right to choose 
retained land
Three ha
10 years( stepwise ispleoentation
issssssam
PARC0DE
Five (5) ha go long as actual 
tillers, and detsroined by 
Local People*s Agrarian 
Refore Council (MRCON) 
Higher Units for fareers* 
or fisher folks' coops or 
association
Superior lands to t a w  
ficiaries
Five (5) ha
Five year*! schedule detereined
by PARC0N and by CCMRB
40
Comparison of Node of Landouner Compensation Under RA 6657 and PARCQDE
Table &
im tn iiu n tm a





Fair oarkct valut subjoct tot
- current value of like 
properties
- nature, use and actual 
incone




- social-econonic benefits 
provided by faroers and 
and government to the 
property
Land Price x No. of ha
Fair aarket value subject tot
node of land acquisition 
existence of abusive and 
exploitative practices 
benevolent landouner's 
practicn to tenants/ 
farauorkers
other factore determined 
by CCARD and PARC
Selective and progressive 
coapensation dependent on 
fare size of landounersi
- 7 ha and belout full 
narket value as declared
by landouner (LO) in latest 
tax declaration
- 7 - 24 hat 751 of 
fair aarket value as 
declared by LO in latest 
for declaration
- 24 - 50 hat 501 of 
fair narket value
- above 50 ha 10Z of 
fair market value
Rode of Coapensation Cash Cash
above 50 hat 25Z| balance 
to be paid in government 
financial instruments nego­
tiation at any tine 
24 - 50 ha 30Z, 
balance same as above 
24 and belout 35Z| 
balance saae as above 
stock shares 
tax credits
LB bonds! aarket interest
less than 7 hat SOZj 
balance in 5 equal 
annual installaents 
24 - 50 hat 20Z| 
balance in 10 equal 
annual installaents 






rates) 10 percent of value 
natures every year which can 
be ased by landowner to pay 
taxes, acquire qovernaent 
property, pay tuition fees, 
etc.
Stock shares in govern- 
oeut corporations, LBP 
or other qualified govt.
Direct payoent in cash 
or in kind by faraer 
beneficiaries





Voluntary offer to sell 
lands additional 9 percent 
cash
Incentives for invest­
ment in rural-based 
industries
Investoent infornation, 
financial and counselling 
assistance
Facilities, progress and 
scheoes for conversion of 
land paynent ootp other 
financial investnent 
Marketing of LBP bands
Landowners with faros 
seven ha and below 
given concessional loans 
Collateral loans used 
for agro-industrialization
DLT lands that are not 
fully paid shall be 




Not oentioned Payoent using owner's 




In contrast, PARCODE adopts a progressive and selective mode of compensation. 
This means that the smaller the landholdings, the higher the compensation to be paid to 
the landowners. Under this scheme, landowners whose holdings are seven ha and below 
will be fully compensated; in addition, they shall be given credit incentives if they 
undertake agro-industrial activities. On the other hand, landowners whose holdings 
exceed 50 ha will be paid an equivalent of 10 percent of the declared market value.
The payment will also be selective based on the following criteria: manner of land 
acquisition, existence of exploitative and abusive practices by the landowner, personal 
relations between landowners and farmworkers and other factors to be determined by the 
local-based agrarian reform committees.
The other basic differences between the two measures are: (a) the inclusion of a 
progressive real property tax in PARCODE; and (b) the varied modes of compensation 
allowed in PARCODE. The implementation of a land tax to complement this reform will 
hasten land redistribution; will ensure intensive use of the land; will generate government 
revenues; and will serve as a disincentive for land speculation (Hayami, Quisumbing and 
Adriano 1990). Innovative in PARCODE is its openness to different modes of 
compensation, including direct market transactions between the landowner and the 
farmworker. While this requires close supervision by unbiased locally-based agrarian 
reform committees to ensure the protection of the farmworkers’ rights, this flexibility in 
the sale of land can nevertheless speed up the acquisition and redistribution of agricultural 
iana, especially those which are voluntarily being offered for sale by the landowners 
themselves.
In brief, PARCODE, if successfully implemented, promises to be more egalitarian 
than RA 6657. But as mentioned earlier, it will meet more resistance from the propertied 
class. For it to be successfully implemented, PARCODE requires a government willing 
and capable to enforce it as well as an organized peasant group that can physically 
support the undertakings of the government.
Comparison of Provisions Affecting the Prospective Beneficiaries. A closer 
inspection of the prospective beneficiaries targetted by both reform measures would 
reveal that PARCODE’s list encompasses to a large degree the agricultural share tenants, 
lessees, and landless but cultivating farm workers of public and private lands (Table 7). 
The main features characterizing PARCODE’s targetted beneficiaries are that: (a) they are 
tillers of the land; (b) because of their low income status, they have no access to and 
control of this scarce resource; and (c) farming is their main occupation. Innovative 
inclusions in PARCODE’s list which nonetheless still reflect the bias of this proposed 
reform measure for the rural poor and the underprivileged are the small fishermen and 
rural women who are widowed, single parents, abandoned women, and single women 
who are heads of the family. It also includes as eligible beneficiaries all peasants and 
farmworkers who occupied agricultural lands prior to the passage of the measure.22
22. The inclusion of this provision directly refers to the peasants’ and farmworkers' takeover of some 70,000 hectares of 
land immediately after the EDSA revolution. Under EO 229 and RA 6657, these tiller-occupants are not eligible 
beneficiaries of agrarian reform (Tadcm 1988).
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Tiblc 7
Cooparison of Provision* to Beneficiaries Under RA UNI and PARCODE
RA 4*57 PARCODE
Beneficiaries Agricultural share tenants 
Agricultural lessees 
Regular/seasonal faruuorker*
Actual tillers or occupants
of public land
Other farnuorkers






Veterans and retirees of 
the Aroed Forces of the 
Phil, and Integrated 
National Police 
Agricultural graduates








Actual landless tillers/ 
occupants of public land 
Snail fishernen 
Rural uouon (especially 
uidoued, single uooen 
parent, abandoned uonen, 
single uonen head of the 
fanily)
Collectives or coop­
eratives of' above 
beneficiaries 
Other direct producers 
deprived of adcess to 
a control of natural 
resources





30 annual aoortizations 
at bl interest
first 3 years, payoent nay be 
at reduced rates
Acquisition cost less all 
land rentals and uncoo- 
pensated labor fron start 
of tenancy
17 equal annual aeortizatiaos 
uithout interest 




Not transferable except 
to legal heir, govemaent 
LBP, or other beneficiaries 
after 10 years
Not transferable except 
to tilling heir or other 
uenbers of fanily oho uill 
till the land
If fanily is not ready to 
till, transfer title 











Governeent subsidies for 
irrigation facilities
Price support and 
guarantee scheM
Credit
Proeoting snail- and aediua- 
scale industries
R 4 D and lou-cost/ 
ecologically-sound technique
Coop aanagenent training 
Market information 






Credit to farMrs' group 
More agricultural extension 
uorkers
R I D  especially 
lou-cost and ecologically- 
sound technologies 
Technological training 
for Honen to lighten 
their fieldwork, day care 
services, etc.
Free irrigation services 
Marketing, storage, and 
warehousing facilities 
Market and price inform­
ation
Skills upgrading for farMrs 
and educating the public on 
fare ecology 
Government and private 




initially and tlwn 




Using the rural class stratification developed by Quisumbing and Adriano (1988), 
PARCODE’s list focuses on the peasantry with limited access to and control of the land 
they cultivate and the rural proletariat. In contrast, RA 6657, while it is also inclined 
towards landless rural producers and workers, favors in actuality the medium- and 
large-sized peasant owners (landowners of five to 24 ha), local agribusiness coiporations, 
and to a lesser degree, hacienda, owners.
The distinguishing feature of PARCODE is the effective payment of prospective 
beneficiaries. While it stipulates that farmer- beneficiaries will pay the amount equivalent 
to the acquisition cost of the land, this reform incorporated a provision that from this total 
cost, previous land rentals and uncompensated backpay wages will be deducted. In effect, 
PARCODE recommends to many agrarian reform areas zero payment from the 
beneficiaries (Tadem 1987). In contrast, RA 6657 expects re-payment from the 
beneficiaries, the amount of which will be determined by LBP, payable in at 30 annual 
amortizations at 6.0 percent interest rate.
Of the different provisions in PARCODE, it was the tree distribution concept which 
elicited much controversy in the agrarian reform debate. While peasant organizations 
generally favor this provision, many cause-oriented NGOs (e.g., FARM23) agree that the 
proposed provision is not politically and economically viable. Taking into account the 
present political configuration and the financial constraint of the government, free 
distribution will only fuel the political resentment and opposition of the landlord bloc, 
thereby impeding the implementation of the reform. Moreover, the process of land 
acquisition and distribution entails huge financial cost on the government; payment from 
the beneficiaries, while not sufficient to cover these costs, can at least pay for a portion of 
these expenditures. Moreover, considering that it is payment for a scarce resource, the 
remuneration is justified to reflect the scarcity of this factor of production.
Other provisions directed to the beneficiaries and which markedly differ from RA 
6657 are: first, while both measures limit the transferability of property rights by the 
beneficiaries, RA 6657 favors the legal heirs and the state as the second generation of 
beneficiaries while PARCODE, consistent with its overriding principle of "land to the 
tillers," limits the transferability of land contracts to tilling heirs and other members of the 
family who will cultivate the lands. A unique feature of PARCODE is the trust fund 
system wherein the property rights of the land are initially placed under the trust of a 
peasant organization until the members of the beneficiary’s family are ready to cultivate 
the lands.
Second, under the PARCODE, real property taxes will be charged against targetted 
beneficiaries as well; RA 6657, on the other hand, does not have a similar provision. The 
inclusion of this provision enables the government to extract surplus from the agricultural 
sector and transfer these resources for financing the economy’s transition to development
23. FARM is the acronym for Forum for Agrarian Reform Movement, a coalition of several NGOs supporting the 
implementation of a comprehensive agrarian reform.
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(Habito 1988). It is also an efficient policy instrument for ensuring the optimal 
cultivation of land.
And, thirdly, both measures prioritize the forms of support services required by the 
potential beneficiaries to enable them to become productive producers. Judging from the 
list of support services itemized in PARCODE, the latter measure provides a 
comprehensive infrastructural and support services requirements of small-scale rural 
producers, from farm production to downstream and upstream activities. A unique 
inclusion is the need for education programs aimed at upgrading the skills of rural 
producers and enhancing the public awareness on farm ecology. It also specifies the 
utilization of government and private surveyors to speed up the land tiding process. 
Lasdy, it recognizes the need for technological training tailored to rural women producers 
as well as institutional arrangements and technologies that will lighten household chores 
of rural women.
Comparison of Land Contracts. The two measures are similar in the sense that they 
prohibit tenancy contracts, encourage owner-cultivatorship, and regulate lease rentals to 
25 percent (Table 8). Their difference stems from: (a) their treatment of direct labor 
arrangement; and (b) their positions on leases and other managerial contracts of 
foreign-owned agribusiness corporations. Specifically, RA 6657 encourages direct wage 
system and longer phase-out time schedule for foreign-controlled plantation. In contrast, 
PARCODE discourages direct wage system and recommends a shorter phase-out period 
for the said plantations; moreover, acquisition and distribution of plantation lands will 
include the land improvements.
Comparisons on Prohibited Acts and Penalty Clause. Except for non-cultivation 
by landowners of subject land as a prohibited Act in PARCODE, the two measures are 
similar in what constitute actions that are against the principles of agrarian reform (Table 
9). What differentiates the two measures is that PARCODE stipulates stiffer penalties for 
outright evasions of agrarian reform. RA 6657, on the other hand, applies an 
across-iiie-buard penalty clause, regardless of the gravity of the wrongdoing.
Conclusion. Based on the above discussion, it is clear that PARCODE has been 
designed primarily to address the inequality problem, arising from skewed landownership 
distribution. If successfully implemented, the direct beneficiaries of this reform measure 
would be the actual tillers of the land belonging to the bottom rung of the rural class 
stratification.
To the extent that it promotes essentially a more homogenous operational farm size, 
the program can achieve the efficiency objective so long as it equally removes the 
bottlenecks impeding small farmers’ access to productive resources other than land 
(Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano 1990). Moreover, because of its inclusion of the 
enforcement of a property tax, mechanisms for generating and transferring rural surplus 
from the reformed and non-reformed areas are institutionalized. Lastly, the political 
objective of PARCODE is clear and, that is, to build and strengthen the rural power base, 
enabling the previously poor and underprivileged in the countryside to actively participate 
in the dynamics of politics.
Table 8



















except in coops 
faros
25 percent




Comparison of Prohibited Acts and Penalty Clauses Under RA 4457 and PARCODE
RA 4457 PARCODE
Prohibited Acts Ounership in excess 
of retention limit
Forcible entry or 
illegal detention of 
unqualified beneficiaries
Conversion of land
Hillful prevention of 
CARP
Sale, transfer, 
or change of nature of 
lands
Sale, transfer or 
of beneficiary
Penalties Inprisonoent from 
one nonth to 3 years
Ownership of lands in 
excess of 5 ha after 
5 yrs. from passage of 
law
Future of landowner 
to register his holdings
Eviction, exclusion, or 
forced removal of tenant, 
or eviction or outright 
replacement of formulation
Sale, disposition, land 
execution of nanageoent 
contrast on private land 
after law
Conversion of agricultural 
land
Entry and occupation with 
the use of force, intimi­
dation or threat
Non-cultivators of land




It should be stressed that PARCODE does not envision a socialist-based countryside 
wherein the ownership of the land is solely granted to the state. The proposed program 
worked within the context of individual property ownership rights. What was significant 
about this position was that it was a common agenda arrived at through consensus 
building, thereby transcending the wide range of political tendencies represented in the 
CPAR alliance (Gillego 1988).
Applying the typology of land reforms developed by de Janvry (1981) and initiated by 
Lenin (1899), one will note that PARCODE’s vision of development in the countryside is 
an egalitarian economy dominated by modernized peasants. Land reform in this case is 
viewed as an instrument for effecting this transition.
In contrast, RA 6657 follows a junker-farmer route, or a combination of plantation 
and small farms. Such a transition path will tend to exacerbate income inequality in the 
countryside as plantation owners, because of their political and economic influence, will 
tend to capture the gains from economic growth.
Having assessed the agrarian reform law, let us now discuss the implementation of 
CARL between 1987 and 1990 and assess how the bottlenecks/loopholes in the law have 
served as the major stumbling blocks for attaining the agrarian reform objectives.
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF RA 6657 IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of RA 6657 relies heavily on the Department of Agrarian Reform 
(DAR), the agency tasked specifically with this purpose. This section examines DAR’s 
performance in land reform and the major problems it has encountered in implementing 
RA 6657.
Land Distribution
For the years from July 1987 to 1990, 1.2 million ha were distributed under EO 229 
and RA 6657 (Table 10). This covers roughly 14 percent of the total land area of this 
reform measure. Compared to the pre-CARL period, the performance of DAR during the 
CARL years immensely improved especially in the distribution of rice and corn lands, as 
well as landed estates and resettlements. For both land type categories, DAR more than 
doubled the area covered during the pre-CARL years.
The largest land type that was reformed between 1987 and 1990 was that of 
agricultural and disposable (A & D) public agricultural lands, covering close to half a 
million ha. However, this comprises only about 10 percent of the total targetted A & D 
public lands. Next to this land type are the rice and corn lands, at 382,000 ha, followed 
by landed estates, at 193,000 ha.
Significant achievement in land distribution was recorded for government-owned 
lands wherein the actual coverage exceeded the targetted coverage. Majority of these 
lands were those leased to foreign-owned agribusiness corporations, mainly, Del Monte, 
Dole and Sime Darby. The promulgation of Executive Order (EO) 407, mandating all 
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DAR for land distribution, also expedited the acquisition and distribution of these types of 
lands. Of the total government-owned lands distributed between 1987 and 1990, 53,359 
ha were the direct result of this EO.
Land reform was slowest in privately-owned agricultural lands, where only 17,893 ha, 
or 0.8 percent of the total land area distributed during the years in review, was covered by 
RA 6657. No lands were acquired and distributed under the categories of idle and 
abandoned as well as PCGG-foreclosed and sequestered lands, two categories which 
supposedly are priority one in the land reform list.
As Bulatao (1991) correctly points out, half of DAR’s achievement in land reform for 
these years were actually covered by the traditional land reform programs. Specifically, 
the distribution of rice and com lands falls under the Operation Land Transfer of PD 27 
while the landed estates distribution is a continuation of RAs 1400 (1955) and 3844 
(1963) as amended by RA 6389 (1971). If these were deducted from the land reform 
accomplishment for the years from 1987 to 1990, the effective area of RA 6657 is 5.9 
million ha, or 7.0 percent of the total targetted coverage.
The emphasis on completing pre-CARL agrarian reform programs was initially the 
banner program of then DAR Secretary Philip Ella Juico. He was aiming at 
accomplishing PD 27 by the end of 1990 before proceeding to the other land types. 
Unfortunately, the Garchitorena scandal prevented him from continuing his plans.
To put more focus on the broad-based strategy of CARL, former Secretary Florencio 
Abad identified 24 strategic operating provinces (SOPs) where land acquisition and 
distribution can be facilitated and where successful land reformed farms through 
coordinated provision and delivery of infrastructure and support services can be 
showcased (Table 11). Like Juico, however, he did not stay long in his position to 
accomplish his plans.
The next Secretary, Benjamin Leong, adopted the 24 SOPs while limiting the land 
reform aspect in pre-CARL programs. Thus, in 1990, more than three-fourths of the 
actual land covered were rice and com lands as well as the resettlements and landed 
estates.
The low land distribution accomplishment of DAR in the past three years has 
encouraged the Presidential Agrarian Reform Committee (PARC) to downscale the land 
acquisition and distribution targets on the basis of actual performance and the pace of 
delivery of support services to agrarian reform beneficiaries (PARC 1991). This only 
means that the land reform aspect will take longer than the 10-year time frame as 
stipulated in RA 6657. Using past performance as an indicator, it will take roughly 19 
years or longer before the total targetted coverage of CARL is reformed.
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Excluding the A & D public lands, DAR has distributed 604,796 Emancipation 
Patents (EPs) and Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to a total of 496,538 
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Hueber of Farner Beneficiaries by Region and Land Tyne, 1987-1990 
6ov't.-oened Lands Private Agric'l. Lands Resettleeent I Landed Estates
Region FBs X of Total FBs Z of Total FBs X of Tol
I 0 0 122 2.2 897 1.0
II 4,893 9.9 1,029 18.2 6,287 7.0
III 113 0.2 0 0 12,923 14.0
IV 308 0.6 837 14.8 13,788 19.4
V 79 0.2 293 9.2 1,196 1.3
VI 4,694 9.9 330 3.8 2,902 3.2
VII 2,200 4.9 0 0 1,131 1.3
VIII 4,316 8.8 39 1.0 8,019 8.9
IX 2,239 4.6 6 0.1 1,899 2.1
X 13,917 28.4 1,160 20.9 13,274 14.8
II 16,346 33.3 461 8.2 4,990 9.1
XII 0 0 1,104 19.3 23,317 26.0
CAR 98 0.1 298 4.6 0 0
PHIL. 49,083 100.0 9,639 100.0 89,741 100.0
FBs > farner-beneficiaries 
Table 12 (Continuation)
f l t t e B H s a g s M M t l i M B B e B m i M M i B M M i M K W M i i e g W e B e t e a s g s g s t e a a e i e t e e e w g n e e M B w i B g B g ^ i n t T y - i i a M i y y i i ^
Operation PCGfi-Surrendered/ Idle and Abandoned
Land Transfer Sequestered Lands Lands TOTAL
Region Area X of Total Area Z of Total Area Z of Total FBs Percent
I 37,359 10.7 0 0 0 0 38,578 8.0
II 50,632 14.4 0 0 0 0 62,801 13.0
CAR 1,427 0.4 0 0 0 0 1,743 0.4
III 77,632 22.1 0 0 0 0 90,270 18.0
IV 24,399 6.9 0 0 1,445 100.0 40,737 8.2
V 49,524 13.0 0 0 0 0 47,092 9.5
VI 17,297 4.9 0 0 0 0 29,188 5.1
VII 21,294 6.0 0 0 0 0 22,566 4.5
VIII 28,022 8.0 0 0 0 0 40,412 8.1
IX 10,185 3.0 0 0 0 0 14,285 2.9
X 13,606 3.9 0 0 0 0 41,957 8.4
XI 8,B68 2.9 0 0 0 0 30,265 6.1
XII 19,168 4.3 0 0 0 0 40,693 8.2
PHIL. 391,313 100.0 0 0 1,445 100.0 496,538 100.0
Source! OAR Acconplishsent Reports. 
FSs * Faraer-beneficiaries
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found in rice and com farms while the remaining are found mostly in resettlement and 
government-owned lands. The large recorded number of beneficiaries and titles could be 
due to a possible double-awarding of titles, as alleged by a senator, and the inclusion of 
farmworkers who were not actually awarded lands but rather were given shares of stocks. 
Moreover, many of the beneficiaries in the previous land reform measures were already 
awarded certificates of land title (Bulatao 1991). What remains to be done is the actual 
formal transfer of the property rights to the prospective beneficiaries; specifically, it 
requires DENR to accomplish the technical surveys and DAR to generate the titles, 
register the documents with the Register of Deeds and distribute them to the beneficiaries.
A breakdown of the beneficiaries by regions reveals that many of these beneficiaries 
come from Regions II and in  (Table 12). The Cordillera Autonomous Region registered 
the lowest number of beneficiaries.
Non-Land Transfer and Deferment Schemes
Corporate Stock Distribution. As of the first quarter of 1991, the DAR has received 
from 84 corporate farms applications for corporate stock distribution (Table 13). This 
covers a total of 28,012 ha and affects some 20,177 farmers. So far, about eight 
corporations with an area of 6,126 ha, have been allowed to convert the land value 
equivalent into stock shares. Interestingly, the first corporation which was exempted from 
land distribution by virtue of this scheme was Hacienda Luisita, the sugar plantation 
owned by the family of President Aquino. This farm covers 4,196 ha, affecting 6,296 
farmworkers.
About 10,972 ha are still under review by PARC; a substantial portion of this area is 
located in Negros Occidental and Leyte. Several corporations with an area of 7,209 ha 
have withdrawn their applications while 3,509 ha are virtually exempted from land reform 
as a consequence of the Supreme Court decision which ruled the exclusion of livestock 
and poultry farms from this reform measure.
Deferment Scheme. At present, there are about 4,295 commercial farms which have 
applied for land reform deferment (Table 14). The total area of these farms is 194,766 ha, 
of which 18 percent have already been approved for deferment Majority of these farms 
are located in Regions HI, IV, VI, IX, and XI.
Land Use Conversion. There are two types of land use conversions — the legal 
conversions or those who formally requested from DAR permission to convert their lands 
from agricultural to non-agricultural use, and the illegal conversions, those who have not 
sought request from this agency. Because of limited enforcement and lack of penalty 
provisions, it is suspected that the illegal type of conversion is much larger than the area 
of those who have sought conversion approval from DAR (DA 1991).
The extent of land use conversion is partly reflected in Table 15. As of March 1991, 
legal land use conversion applications cover close to 7,000 ha. The top six provinces with 
the most conversion applications are Cavite, Laguna, Rizal, Pampanga, Negros 
Occidental and Batangas (Table 16). The area for conversion in these provinces already 
constitute close to three-fourths of the total area with conversion applications.
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Table 13
Status of Corporate Stock Distribution by Province 
as of Harch 26, 1991
Area 1 of Nuaber Z of
No. of Fans (Has.) Total of FBs Total
1. Approved 8 6,126 21.9 0,008 39.7
2. Under Evaluation 54 10,972 39.2 5,883 29.2
3. Disapproved 1 196 0.7 30 0.1
4. Excepted due to SC decision 9 3,509 12.5 1,948 9.7
5. Hithdraun Applicants 12 7,209 25.7 4,308 21.4
TOTAL 84 28,012 100.0 20,177 100.0
Z of Total to potential
land reforn coverage 0.27
Z of Total to Total nunber
of fareer-beneficiaries (FBt) 0.52
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Of the total 6,925.4 ha covered by land use conversion requests, 1,794 ha (or 31 
percent) have already been approved for conversion, 3,279 ha (or 47 percent) are still 
being processed, while 1,475 ha (or 21 percent) are covered by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) ruling (on February 1990) which automatically exempts these lands from 
conversion decisions of DAR.
Majority of the conversion requests are conversions either for residential or for 
industrial purposes. Of the top 15 provinces with conversion requests, 46 percent is for 
residential purposes while 35 percent is for industrial use (Table 16). Much of the land 
use conversion have affected prime agricultural lands, majority of which have irrigated 
facilities (DA 1991).
The increasing rate of conversion applications has been bolstered partly because of the 
desire of landowners to circumvent CARL and partly due to the windfall gains generated 
from real estate speculation (Penalba 1991). The fact that the country has no national 
land use policy which could serve as a framework for land use conversions coupled with 
the fact that the penalty clause (which at any rate is minimal), the enforcement 
mechanisms, and the real property tax are not fully operationalized, have enhanced further 
the conversion process.
Leasehold Operations. In croplands where land transfer has not taken place, tenurial 
arrangements were changed from share tenancy to leasehold contracts (Table 17). In 
1990, about 28,726 ha of leasehold areas were under the operation land transfer (OLT) of 
PD 27 and the residual, 47,439 ha, or 60 percent, were tenanted lands under the scope of 
RA 6657.
The regulation in share tenancy has been premised on the inefficient and exploitable 
effect of this contract. It is interesting to note, however, that despite its legal prohibition, 
this tenurial arrangement persists in the countryside. Empirical studies on PD 27 
reformed lands (e.g., Hayami 1990) have shown the resurgence of sub-tenancy contracts, 
wherein the land cultivation rights are pawned in exchange for credit and other support 
services. This usually entails a shift of cultivation rights from the tillers of the land to 
larger farmers and middlemen, moneylenders, and landlords. The latter, in turn, hired 
permanent laborers rather than workers on a tenancy basis because the latter practice is 
illegal. This, therefore, reduces the opportunities of landless workers to improve their 
welfare through a better working arrangement.
Conclusion. The employment of non-land transfer scheme as a substitute to land 
reform has been on an upward trend since its implementation in 1987. In terms of 
hectarage, the area of non-land transfer is close to a fifth of the total reformed area for the 
years from 1987 to 1990. The significance of this figure is that unless the government 
decides on whether or not the appropriate landownership structure should be based on 
small- or large-sized farms, the reform, if the trend continues, will hardly result to any 
restructuring of the landownership pattern. It will also have grave implications on the 
efficient use of this scarce resource.
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Table 16
Extent of Legal Land Use Conversions By Province 
(as of Harch 1991)
8 S S S * 8 £ S £ S S 3 S e s S S * 3 a S 8 = 2 * f c S X S S 8 C £ n S C C S 3 B S S f c S a S * B 8 M K S M * £ S a s e s r a S S t t C n * S S S S 8 * S B S X B * e 8 8 S 9 a e g S X S S S * a s S f i C t t * S 3
COVERED APPLICATIONS
UNDER DOJ BEING
PROVINCE APPROVED OPINION PROCESSED TOTAL
No. Res. I Ind. No. Res. Z Ind. No. Res. Z Ind. No. Res. Z Ind.
Laguna 37B.4 25.2 64.8 676.1 NS 98.9 501.8 7.8 87.8 1556.3 134.4 1354.5
Cavite 384.7 37.1 49.5 416.1 24.7 70.3 784.2 39.6 15.5 1585.0 555.8 604.3
Rizal 81.9 89.6 8.4 38.2 89.5 NS 503.0 100.0 NS 623.1 610.6 15.4
Batangas 99.3 36.6 48.8 NS NS NS 157.7 48.2 5.4 262.4 112.3 57.0
Quezon 43.0 90.0 NS NS NS NS 75.6 16.5 99.2 118.6 51.6 7.5
Paepanga 153.6 58.1 13.9 16.0 100.0 NS 247.1 96.1 3.9 476.7 402.7 31.0
Nueva Ecija 94.6 97.9 NS NS NS NS 39.4 NS NS 134.0 92.6 NS
Bulacan 12.3 25.2 NS 39.9 100.0 NS 86.5 14.3 NS 138.7 55.4 NS
Leyte 2.0 NS 45 NS NS NS 152.5 12.2 10.1 154.5 18.6 16.3
Cebu 17.7 13.0 NS NS NS NS 74.B 49.2 NS 92.5 39.1 NS
Aklan NS NS NS NS NS NS 80.1 NS NS 80.1 NS NS
Negros
Occidental 156.7 100.0 NS 202.2 95:2 NS 9.2 NB NS 368.1 348.9 NS
South
Cotabato 38.2 84.3 2.4 NS NS NS 148.0 100.0 NS 186.2 180.2 6.0
Cotabato NS NS NS NS NS NS 47.8 100.0 NS 47.8 47.8 NS
Lanao del 
Norte 3.2 100.0 NS NS NS NS 43.0 100.0 NS 46.2 46.2 NS
TOTAL 146.6 766.3 519.4 1449.1 445.2 961.2 2950.7 1485.0 602.9 5865.4 2596.5 2083.5
source: Bureau of Land Development, DAR.
00J : Department of Justice 
Res. : Residential Use 
Ind. : Industrial Use 
NS i not significant
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I 4,332 15.08 7,747 31.76 0 0 0 0 4,332 6.00 7,747 17.97
11 788 2.74 544 2.23 985 2.27 1,004 5.36 1,773 2.46 1,548 3.59
III 6,719 23.39 3,998 16.19 1,907 4.39 1,033 5.52 8,626 11.95 4,981 11.55
IV 2,386 B.31 1,520 6.23 619 1.42 413 2.21 3,005 4.16 1,933 4.48
V 12 0.04 14 0.06 12 0.03 2 0.01 24 0.03 16 0.04
VI 5,207 18.13 2,833 11.62 1,411 3.25 680 3.63 6,618 9.17 3,513 8.15
VII 1,397 4.86 3,005 12.32 217 0.49 155 0.63 1,614 2.24 3,160 7.33
VIII 1,141 3.97 741 3.04 3,465 7.98 1,759 9.39 4,606 6.38 2,500 5.79
IX 5,741 19.98 2,826 11.59 2,487 5.72 828 4.42 8,228 11.40 3,654 8.48
X 0 0 0 0 12,662 29.15 6,607 35.29 12,662 17.55 6,607 15.33
XI 0 0 O' 0 19,201 44.20 6,022 32.17 19,201 26.61 6,002 13.97
XII 444 1.54 267 1.09 453 1.04 179 0.96 897 1.24 446 1.03
CAR 559 1.94 944 3.87 20 0.05 38 0.20 579 0.80 982 2.28
PHIL. 28,726 100.00 24,389 100.00 43,439 100.00 18,720 100.00 72,165 100.00 43,109 100.00
sssssssISSSSSSB&BSSSBCBSSSBBl----- BS88Sfc«888SSftSBB8&3 B8SS8SS8M tasssantw RlftlKC
Sources DAR 1990 Accoeplisheent Report.
RA 6657 = the Conpreheniive Agrarian Ref o n  Law (CARL) 
OLT = Operation Land Transfer 
FDs = Fareer-beneficiaries
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Provision and Delivery o f Support Services
Estimates of physical and financial performance of CARL implementing agencies as 
computed by the PARC Secretariat for its meeting with foreign donors in mid-1991, 
reveal a lackluster accomplishment (Table 18). In terms of physical performance, DTI’s 
management and entrepreneurial training for landowners registered the highest 
performance at 96 percent while DOLE’S extension service to plantation workers and 
farmworkers exhibited the lowest accomplishment at 40 percent Land Bank’s financial 
disbursement, comprising mainly of landowner’s compensation, provision of production 
loans, and collection of transfer amortizations, showed a record high of 127 percent while 
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in terms of its land titling activities was a poor 
low of 34 percent.
Noticeable in the accomplishment rating is the substandard performance of DAR and 
agencies directly assisting in the land acquisition and distribution aspect, namely, DENR 
and LRA. DAR’s fund utilization for this particular activity (supposedly, the banner 
program of this department) as a proportion of its total disbursement has declined from 52 
percent in 1987 to 13 percent in 1990 (Table 19). Surprisingly, more spending in land 
acquisition and distribution was done in 19S7, when CARL was not yet a law, than in the 
succeeding years when CARL was supposedly in full swing.
Utilization of the Agrarian Reform Fund, the major fund sources for this program, has 
also favored heavily the funding for the provision of support services to agrarian reform 
beneficiaries than for the land reform component (Table 20). While there is no doubt that 
a larger financial proportion is required for support services and infrastructural 
development, the initial phase of this program depends on the pace and extent of land 
acquisition and distribution. It is thus cost- and time-efficient if DAR focuses its 
resources on the land reform component and re-assign the task of coordinating and 
funding the support services and infrastructural component to PARC. By diffusing its 
resources to these two large components, DAR has, in effect, sacrificed the main 
objective of the reform measure and, that is, to equalize the landownership structure 
through land distribution.
The estimates of financial performance recorded in Table 22 are verified in the next 
table where a summary of PARC-approved budget, advice of allotment (A/A) releases 
and disbursements by CARP implementing agencies for the years from 1987 to 1990 is 
presented. With some slight deviations, this table, as in the previous one, highlights the 
large amount allocated for support services vis-a-vis land acquisition and distribution. 
The varied disbursement performance of the various agencies from a low of 10 percent to 
a high of 164 percent, reflect in large part the degree of importance accorded by these 
agencies to CARP. More importantly, it illustrates the need for PARC as the coordinating 
agency, to identify the support services which should be prioritized and funded by the 
agrarian reform fund. It is ironic that while agrarian reform is the centerpiece program of 
the government, an additional fund on top of the budget appropriation for the different 
agencies concerned, has to be earmarked specifically for the provision of support services 
of this program and not as an integral component factored in the agencies’ appropriations.
Table 18
Physical vs. Financial Perforaance 
of CARL lapleeenting Agencies 
(As Per Hork and Financial Plan)
SSSS5S?SSSS3r«& £SS=SSSX $£±SSSSS3tt*S2=SSS8SSS3S8SS3SSSS*ttlSSS33SS
Accoaplishaents
Agency Major Activities Physical Financial
(1) m
DAR Undertakes land acquisition
and distribution activities 
and orchestrates the delivery 
of support services to faraer- 
beneficiaries. 38 61
DENR Conducts final survey of 
private agricultural lands, 
cadastral survey for public 
A t D lands and parcellary 
survey of ISF areas. 43 60
DA Provides technical assistance
to faraer beneficiaries to 
facilitate their access to 
production inputs, narketing 
and post production faci­
lities; and training on 
institutional and organ­
izational developaent faraing 
systea. 47 65
LRA Undertakes registration and
titling of EPs/CLDAs/FPs
through Registers of Deeds. 75 34
NIA Undertakes construction,
rehabilitation and isprove-
aent of irrigation projects. 51 76
LBP Responsible for land valuation
and coapensation, handles the 
retailing of production loans, 







DPNH Undertakes the construction 
of infrastructure and faci­
lities such as rural roads, 
aulti-purpose pavenent. 50 44
DTI Provides training on aanage- 
aent and entrepreneurship to 
landouners to assist thca in 
channeling their resources to 
productive ventures and 
establish SCF/s/AIP for CARP 
beneficiaries. 96 59
DOLE Provides extension services 
to plantation Markers and 
assist in the foraation of 
self-reliant organizations. 40 39
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Land Acquisition and Distribution (LAB) 1.734 18.5
Landowners coopensation 0.912
Other LAD activities 0.822
Support Services 7.641 81.5
TOTAL 9.375 100.0
Source: Presidential Agrarian Refore Coonittee (1991)
Table 21
Projected vs. Actnal Renittences 
(For the period 1987-1990, in billion pesos)
(a) (b) (b) t (a) i 100
Agency Projected Actual Perforeance
APT P19.700 813.809 70.1
PCC6 13.500 2.481 18.4
Total 833.20 816.290 49.1
ssaisssaaaiaia
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Financial Status o f CARL
The major source of CARP financing is the Agrarian Reform Fund (ARF), a special 
allocation created by Proclamation No. 131 in 1987 amounting to P50 billion. 
Appropriations for the ARF are generated from the following: (a) proceeds from the sales 
of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT); (b) earnings of the Presidential Commission on 
Good Government (PCGG); (c) proceeds from the disposition of government properties 
in foreign countries, and (d) official foreign aid grants and concessional financing. Since 
item (d) can be used only for the provision and delivery of support services and rural 
infrastructure and since item (c) sources are not stable, the large portion of ARF, 
therefore, relied mainly on APT and PCGG funds.
However, the track record performance of these two agencies in terms of remittance 
generation has been very low (Table 21). From 1987 to 1990, the projected remittances 
were P33.2 billion, broken down as follows: P19.7 billion from the APT and the residual, 
P13.5 billion, from the PCGG. The actual remittance for this period was slightly less than 
half of the projected estimate, or P16.29 billion. Of this total, 85 percent was raised by 
the APT and only 15 percent came from the PCGG. The ratio of actual to projected 
remittance for the APT was 70 percent, whereas for the PCGG, it was at a dismally low 
figure of 18 percent
For the 10-year time frame of CARP, it is estimated that the expected cash outflows 
will amount to P37 billion (Bautista and Lajom 1991). This means a high deficit of 
P146.7 billion. A slightly large amount than the deficit (or P149.6 B) will be required for 
the CARP implementation between 1993 and 1997. For the period from 1988 until 1992, 
the amount required is estimated at P33.5 billion. For 1991, the projected remittances 
from the APT and PCGG is only P4.3 billion (PARC 1991). With the PCGG and APT 
previous funds of P16.3 billion and P0.7 billion from foreign sources (i.e., USAID), a 
financial gap amounting to P I2.2 billion still remains.
Bautista and Lajom (1991) contend that the resource base for CARP implementation 
can be increased substantially, by either enhancing the financial base or improving the 
efficiency of the present implementation system. Under the former option, the possible 
venues are: (a) increasing LBP income generating activities from agrarian operations, i.e., 
farmers’ amortizations and interest earnings from loans extended to the beneficiaries; (b) 
generating foreign funds, either from official development assistance and/or soft loans, to 
financing the support services and infrastructure requirements of the programs; (c) 
rationalizing budgetary allocations such that more funds are appropriated for this 
program; and (d) implementing tax reforms and enhancing tax collection.
On the second mechanism, the government can improve the efficiency levels of the 
present implementation system through the following: (a) diverting the present huge 
expenditures on institutional strengthening activities (e.g., landowner training) and 
research and development and data base development to land acquisition and distribution, 
the cornerstone of the program; (b) devising innovative schemes that can shorten the land 
transfer procedure and improve the land valuation; (c) identifying and resolving the 
bottlenecks in the programming and allocation of funds among CARP implementing
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agencies; and (d) streamlining the DAR bureaucracy. Buiatao (1991) adds another 
recommendation: involve NGOs and POs in land acquisition and distribution as well as in 
the identification and speedy delivery of appropriate support services and infrastructure. 
By decentralizing major CARP implementation processes in these organizations, DAR 
can ingenuously reduce its expenditure- while simultaneously institutionalizing a joint 
responsibility system in the implementation of this program.
Major Problems in CARP Implementation
Land Use C, nversion and Need for a National Land Use Policy. In 1990, two 
departments battled over a 240-hectare agricultural land owned by a state-owned 
company. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) argued that the land should not be 
converted into a non-agricultural activity and should first be covered by agrarian reform, 
enabling the tenants to decide on the fate of the land. The Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), on the other hand, wanted the land converted into an industrial estate 
arguing that such a conversion will generate employment and bring in foreign exchange 
earnings. Because of the absence of a national land use policy, the dispute was settled 
instead by employing legalistic and pedantic reasonings, both of which were devoid of 
any technical and economic logic.
The major lessons from this experience were: First, without a national land use policy 
that will serve as a framework for the employment and management of this resource, two 
potential uses, i.e., agricultural and industrial, are projected as competing land uses and 
not as complementary economic activities. Second, comparisons done by the DTI of the 
benefits generated from agricultural and non-agricultural activities are lopsided in 
presentation: meaning, that a non-agricultural project is pictured in terms of its potential 
and highest-best use while the agricultural project is described in terms of its actual, and 
not potential and highest-best use. Such lopsided comparisons presume that agricultural 
activity is backward and non-progressive and for industrialization to be hastened, it 
merely requires the replacement of agricultural with industrial activity. And third, the real 
beneficiary from this dispute was the state-owned corporation which gained financially 
from the higher land leases of the industrialist.
Ideally, the establishment of competitive land markets can serve as the regulatory 
mechanism for controlling different land uses. However, under a property right regime 
wherein landownership pattern is highly skewed, land markets will aggravate inequality 
and allocate scarce land inefficiently. In the Philippines, for example, land markets exist 
only between landowners and rich prospective buyers. Landowners, the major suppliers 
of land, actually face two types of potential buyers: one, the many landless tenants and 
farmworkers whose desire to own land is high but whose purchasing capacity is low; and 
two, the few real estate developers, agribusiness entities and industrialists whose 
purchasing power, political clout and desire to own land are high. With limited 
government enforcement of agrarian reform, landowners evade this measure and profit in 
the process by selling their land to the highest bidders. The end-result has been numerous 
conversions particularly of prime agricultural lands, higher inequality, and most likely, 
adverse effects to future food production.
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A national land use policy can provide the framework and ground rules for the 
creation of an efficient and equity-sensitive land market. Likewise, if properly 
formulated, it can ensure a smooth structural transformation from an agricultural to an 
industrial economy.
It is ironic, however, that this country wherein more than half of its population 
depend, either directly or indirectly, on land as a prime source of income, does not have a 
national land use policy. The 1987 Philippine Constitution recognizes the need for the 
State to regulate "the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its 
increments," but so far, no legislation has been formulated toward substantiating this role. 
Apart from RA 6657 which regulates farmland ownership, a combination of conflicting 
departmental and local government directives has been issued and enforced resulting in 
competing/conflicting land uses. The choice of what land use will ultimately be 
undertaken has often been influenced by the personal financial gains of the property 
owners and/or by prospective real estate developers, or by the strength of bargaining 
leverage mustered by government departments and local governments in the pursuit of 
their respective objectives. Land use decision at present does not reflect the extent of land 
scarcity nor does it take into account (a) the physiographic and agronomic features of this 
limited resource; (b) the environmental impact of the conversion on the ecosystem in the 
area; (c) the social losses accruing to the communities effected by the land use 
conversions; (d) the social losses that will be borne by future generations; and (e) the 
implications of these changes for ensuring sustainable structural transformation from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy.
To rationalize land use conversion, there is a need to formulate a land use policy. The 
implementation of agrarian reform is an integral aspect of a national land use policy. In 
land-scarce and labor-abundant economies, large-sized farms are not efficient modes of 
productive organizations since the scarce resource (i.e., land) is not used intensively. 
Small-sized farms, in contrast, are much more productive as land is cultivated more 
intensively and these farms employ much more labor. While it is true that the net income 
generated by small-sized farms is much smaller than the net earnings of plantation farms, 
the reason for this discrepancy is not productivity differentials but largely the lack of 
access by small farms to vital support services (e.g., credit) and infrastructure (e.g., 
irrigation). In brief, agrarian reform, a rational land use policy for its objective of 
homogenizing the mode of productive organization in the countryside, reflects the 
scarcity of agricultural land.
Turtle-Paced Land Acquisition and Distribution, In a study conducted by the IPC 
(1991) on land acquisition and distribution, it was observed that for voluntary offer to sell 
(VOS) type of agricultural lands, the process from land acquisition to distribution would 
take normally from 12 to 24 months. The key bottlenecks in the process were (a) the 
many documents that have to be processed and the many offices involved in the process; 
(b) the low land compensation when the land valuation formula was used; (c) the lack of 
knowledge by both the landowners and the prospective beneficiaries on the actual 
process; (d) the dependence on DAR and LBP as main conduits of the process; and (e) the 
lack of DENR surveyors to do the survey.
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This study noted that land acquisition and distribution could be facilitated if certain 
measures were undertaken. First, the process can be streamlined by simplifying the 
documentation requirements and reducing the number of government offices involved. 
Second, the land valuation formula, despite the recent revision, can still be improved. 
The objective should be towards designing a formula that is (a) simple for the fieldmen to 
operationalize, and (b) transparent, so that rent-seeking activities by government 
employees can be minimized. In a separate work (Adriano 1991), it was suggested that 
the formula recommended by Judge Santiago, a landowner, be applied instead. Not only 
is it simple and straightforward but it was also recommended and approved by the 
landlord bloc; this can immensely facilitate the valuation of landowners’ compensation. 
Nevertheless, Santiago’s formula, while it ensures higher value than the government’s 
formula still results to lower land values as the implicit percentage used is lower than the 
25 percent leasehold rental mandated in CARL.
Third, landowners and prospective beneficiaries should be given sufficient 
information on the process involved. An experimental case involving an NGO may be 
useful to replicate in other areas (TRIPARRD). In this case, the NGO, with the 
knowledge and support of national and local-level DAR offices, served as the broker of 
the prospective beneficiaries by facilitating the land acquisition and distribution process. 
With the NGO’s assistance, and financed by a foreign donor, the time period for the 
process was reduced to six months. Crucial to the process was the hiring of private 
surveyors to perform the land surveying and documentation aspects.
And, fourth, alternative land transactions should be developed. Like in the 
PARCODE, direct sale between the landowners and the beneficiaries could be 
experimented, so long as the transaction is closely supervised by NGOs and/or the 
government.
The above discussion only highlights the need to prioritize and hasten land acquisition 
and distribution as this activity is the backbone of the agrarian reform program. 
Innovative mechanisms should be initiated that establish a joint-responsibility to the 
implementation of this activity between NGOs and POs, on one hand, and the 
government sector on the other. Likewise, as cited above, CARP financing should be 
focused in the future on the accomplishment of the land reform component. Identification 
of priority support services and infrastructural requirements should be done in 
consultation with the POs and NGOs so as not to diffuse CARP disbursements in diverse 
cost items, most of which may not have significant positive effects on ensuring 
small-sized farm efficiency and access to productive resources. Lastly, there is a need to 
pressure the government to prioritize land reforms and discourage non-land transfer 
schemes. The latter will not bring about equity and efficiency in the countryside.
Conclusion
The key features of the CARP implementation are as follows: First, the pace of the 
land reform component is slow and mostly concentrated in the implementation of 
traditional land reform programs, namely, PD 27 and RA 6389. Second, there has been 
an upward trend in the non-land transfer component; taken together, the hectarage
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covered by at least the three options (corporate,stock distribution, deferment, and land use 
conversion) is about 229,701 ha, or roughly 20 percent of the total reformed area for the 
years from 1987 to 1990. Third, leasehold arrangements are pursued in tenanted farms 
pending the latter’s transformation into owner-cultivatorship. The preference for land 
contracts of owner-cultivatorship, leasehold, and direct wage system may not be efficient 
considering the recent findings that in the PD 27 reformed areas, there is a reversion to 
sub- tenancy arrangements. Fourth, the provision and delivery of support services and 
rural infrastructure garnered more funds than the land acquisition and distribution 
components. In both components of agrarian reform, however, the performance of 
CARP implementing agencies measured in terms of physical and financial 
accomplishments has been far from satisfactory. Fifth, under the present pattern of 
expenditure, there is and will be a problem of financing CARP implementation. At 
present, the problem may be illusory considering (a) the low and varied disbursement 
patterns exhibited by the CARP implementing agencies, and (b) the inefficiencies in the 
present implementing system. In the future, however, the financial gap is projected to be 
large but may not be insurmountable considering the available venues for increasing the 
financial resource base of CARP. Sixth, measures for improving and hastening the land 
acquisition and distribution process should focus on reducing the time frame of the 
process, simplifying the documents, and instituting a joint-responsibility system with the 
NGOs and POs. Lastly, the indiscriminate and rapid land use conversion cases highlight, 
on one hand, the urgent need for a national land use policy and policy measures that will 
discourage conversion and, on the other, the need to clarify, at least in the mind of the 
government, the role of agrarian reform in the context of agricultural development and 
industrialization.
The issue of the role of agrarian reform in the rural development strategy is both an 
economic and political question. It is economic in the sense that this reform measure 
specifies a particular mode of productive organizations, i.e., a combination of plantation 
and small-sized farms (refer to section 2). As to whether or not this proposed 
landownership structure is the most efficient for the land-scarce and labor-abundant 
economy is an empirical question. Specifically, (a) are small-sized farms as productive as 
large-sized farms?; (b) are there economies of scale in farm production?; and (c) will 
agrarian reform increase the domestic market base and, in turn, fuel rural-based 
industrialization?
The role of agrarian reform in the overall development strategy is equally a political 
question. According to Balisacan (1990), under the present political economy 
configuration of the country, the nature and degree of CARP implementation are in fact 
optimal. But optimal from whose point of view? By examining the political and 
economic gains of the different rural classes who will be affected by the reform, one will 
note that the proposed agrarian structure of CARL is beneficial from the vantage point of 
the propertied (in particular, the agribusiness owners) and the rural middle class; the 
major losers are mainly the landless rural workers, who comprise the majority of the rural 
populace and who form the bulk of the rural poor.
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While the proposed agrarian structure of CARL may be politically "efficient" at 
present, the crucial question, however, remains: will this type of "efficient" mode ensure 
the country’s development? What type of development path will ensue if this mode is 
pursued?
Answers to these questions will be alluded to in the next section where the 
experiences of some countries which implemented agrarian reform are discussed.
V. AGRARIAN REFORM IMPLEMENTATION: A
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON AND ASSESSMENT
This section reviews the agrarian reform literature of several countries which have 
successfully implemented this policy measure but which produced varying impacts on the 
development of their respective countrysite. The purpose of the review is partly to draw 
the similarities and contrasting features of these country experiences with the Philippine 
experience; and partly, to draw the key lessons from these cross-country comparisons and 
project their implications on the implementation of the country’s agrarian reform 
program.
There are two sets of country cases which were examined: (a) the successful Asian 
land reform programs of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and China; and (b) the land reform 
programs of Peru and Chile. For the first country set, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
implemented a land reform program using private property rights as the basic premise 
while China pursued land reform following a socialist perspective. In the second 
countrysite, land reform was implemented under a military regime whose political 
influence was counterbalanced by powerful peasant/farmworker bloc. These country 
experiences are interesting from the vantage point of the Philippines because as Hayami, 
Quisumbing and Adriano (1990) contend, the present Philippine agrarian structure is a 
combination of the Asian (i.e., predominance of small-sized farms) and the Latin 
American (i.e., prevalence of hacienda and agribusiness plantation) modes. For our 
discussion of these country cases, the focus will be on the land reform component of this 
redistributive measure, i.e., the land acquisition and distribution aspects.
Salient Features o f the Land Reform Components
Asian Experience. Table 23 enumerates the salient features of the land reform 
programs of the various countries. The land-to-the-tiller programs in the Asian countries 
were implemented immediately after the war and were accomplished in a short period of 
time. The objective, even in the case of China at that time, was to establish small-sized 
privately-owned peasant farms. Farm size limits ranged between one and six ha with 
owner-cultivatorship as the dominant land contract arrangement. Except for China which 
was essentially confiscatory, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea compensated the 
landowners based on annual yield net of the production costs. In turn, the beneficiaries 
paid for the lands; in Taiwan, land was valued at its acquisition cost, while in Japan, 
valuation was highly subsidized.
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Table 23
Salient Features of Land Refore Proqrans By Country
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Japan, Taiwan and South Korea initiated their land reform programs with tenancy 
regulations. Leasehold arrangements were enforced with Japan stipulating the lowest 
lease rental at 13 percent and Taiwan and South Korea stipulating a one-third rent. In the 
case of the latter, tenancy regulations were implemented simultaneously with the 
expropriation of some 280,000 ha of land previously owned by Japanese nationals, the 
country’s colonialists prior to the outbreak of World War II.
The land acquisition and distribution program of Japan began in 1946, a few years 
ahead of those of Taiwan and South Korea. Indeed, the latter two countries replicated the 
Japanese model when it became apparent that the latter’s land reform was successfully 
implemented. The coverage of the three country programs was extensive (Table 24). In 
Japan, the estimated reformed area was around 2.0 million ha, or 40 percent of the 
country’s cultivated area, and affecting some 4.3 million farm households, or 73 percent 
of the total agricultural households. The reformed area for Taiwan was 334,000 ha, or 38 
percent of its cultivated area. Beneficiaries of the program numbered around 383,000, or 
about two-thirds of Taiwan’s agricultural households at that time. In the case of South 
Korea, the reformed area was 1.1 million ha, or more than half of the country’s cultivated 
area. This benefitted some 1.6 million households, more than three-fourths of the 
country’s agricultural households.
China’s brand of land reform was different from the experience of the previous 
countries. While China began its land reform program in 1949 with the establishment of 
. small-sized peasant farms, by 1952, the government began reorganizing agriculture into 
collective farms. Under the first phase of its land reform program, about 47 million ha, 
or close to half of the country’s total arable lands, were distributed to some 300 million 
farmers (which at that time comprised about half of China’s population). In the 
collectivized agricultural phase which spans from 1952 to 1978, household farms were 
then grouped into agricultural production centers (APCs) which, in turn, were organized 
into people’s communes. By the end of 1958, 26,000 communes were established, each 
comprising of about 25 to 30 APCs with a household membership of around 4,000 
households (Domer and Thiesenhausen 1990). Five years later, the number of communes 
tripled.
The highly centralized organizational structure hardly resulted in significant 
agricultural production so that China’s leaders were forced to change the rural institution 
in 1978. By the mid-80s, the system of land use rights contracts was enforced enabling 
individual family households to directly control and manage the farms.
Latin American Experience. Prior to the reform period, both Peru’s and Chile’s 
agrarian structures, were characterized by highly skewed land ownership patterns and a 
dual mode of productive organization, i.e., the latifundia, comprising of large haciendas 
or plantations and the minifundia, or smallholding types of farm production. In the early 
years of the 1960s, the governments of Peru and Chile introduced agrarian reform 
measures. In the latter, this measure was limited essentially to state-owned agricultural 
lands, while in Peru, expropriation of private lands did not touch the large sugar and 
cotton plantations.
Table 24
Extent and Actual Coverage of Land Distribution








No. 1 Agric'l HH
(N)
China 1930 47 N < 50 50-60 over 30
Taiuan 1934 334 T 38 0.4 73.8
South Korea 1945 1.1 H 33
1950 53 1.6 66
Japan 1949 3.2 H 40 73
Peru 1969 8.6 375 T 20-23
Chile 1973 9.96 N 401 896 T 40
Sourcesi International Issues in Agrarian Reform Past Experiences 
Future Prospects.
J.D. Osorio (1989)
Dorner and Theisenhuscn (1990)
H. Fubr (1986)
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Despite the limited coverage of these reform measures, these paved the way for a 
more redistributive land reform, targetting the large latifundias in the second half of the 
1960s. The fusion of military-controlled government and a politicized 
peasantry/farmworkers in these two countries hastened the expropriation and demise of 
plantations and haciendas, which were dominated by the traditional landlord class. In 
Peru, the dominant landlord class was replaced by the state which, in turn, established 
large cooperative farms. Of the 8.6 ha which it expropriated between 1969 and 1979, 
more than half were transformed into cooperative farms, affecting some 168,000 peasants 
(Fuhr 1986). Only 18 percent of the adjudicated lands were controlled by peasant groups 
and independent peasant farms. Large-sized farms still dominated agricultural production; 
the difference was that these farms were controlled by the state and farm sizes were 
pegged between 150 and 300 ha. The inefficiencies in the cooperative farms coupled 
with die growing peasant movements in the country forced the government in the 1980s 
to decentralize and privatize the cooperative farms. In some highland areas where the 
peasant organizations were powerful, collective farms were abolished and were replaced 
by small and middle peasant-owned farms.
In the Chilean case, expropriation of the latifundias, initially targetting farms in 
excess of the 80-hectarage limit, went into high gear between 1965 and 1973. During this 
period, about 9.9 million ha were expropriated benefitting some 896,000 peasants. The 
expropriated lands were organized into large estates euphemistically referred to as 
settlements. These productive organizations were managed by parastatal institutions 
which, in due time, will supposedly hand the lands to the peasant members for private 
ownership. Expropriation and reorganization in the countryside were accomplished 
swiftly that by 1978, only 5.6 percent of the cultivable lands exceeded the 80 ha farm 
size; 32 percent were between five and 20 ha; and 13 percent had farm sizes of 40 to 80 
ha (Osorio 1989). Like in Peru, the political trade unions and peasant organizations 
pressured the government in the late 1970s to privatize the ownership of the settlements.
Some Political and Economic Factors for Successful Land Reform Implementation
Asian Experience: Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The literatures on land 
reform models generally regard the land reform programs of Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Japan as successful reform measures. Successful in this context is implicitly defined as a 
program that (a) has ensured a more egalitarian land ownership structure; and (b) has 
contributed in paving the structural transformation of the economy from an agricultural to 
an industrial economy.
In all the three country cases, the process of land acquisition and distribution was 
accomplished swiftly and decisively. Several factors, mostly political, facilitated the 
speedy implementation of this particularly difficult process (Table 25). First, the landlord 
class in these countries was immensely weakened by the effects of the war. Second, the 
peasants were highly organized especially in Taiwan and Japan. Third, US aid helped in 
financing this process. And fourth, records on landownership and land classification were 
available, facilitating the acquisition process. In the case of Japan, not only were these
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Faraers using aodarn inputs
Entrepreneurial skills aaong faraers
Saall land size of country
Japanese legacy of agricultural science and 
technology
Inherited Japanese land-saving agricultural 
technology
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records available; there existed efficient administrative structures from the national down 
to the local levels which played an instrumental role in the land reform component.
Equally important in the successful implementation of land reform was the fact that 
unlike in Latin America where landownership distribution was highly concentrated 
because of the prevalence of plantations, in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, 
landownership structures were less skewed as these modes of productive organizations 
were non-existent in these countries.
Agricultural production was not adversely affected by the change in landownership 
structure as operational holdings prior to the reform were already organized in small-sized 
modes. Moreover, because of the farmers’ access to vital productive inputs, technology 
and rural infrastructure (irrigation, transport, communication and electrical power) even 
prior to the reform, productivity after land reform was hardly affected. In the Taiwanese 
case, marked increases in yield were observed largely because of an increase in 
multi-cropping intensity (Yager 1988). The change in tenurial arrangement (from tenancy 
to owner- cultivatorship) in the post-reform period enabled the farmer-beneficiaries in 
these countries to capture the net income gains from their own-farm production (which in 
pre-reform years were shared with the landowner), thereby increasing in the process then- 
purchasing power (see Rhee 1978 for South Korea and Kaneda 1980 for Japan).
A. Taiwan and Japan
Overall, the land reform programs in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea focused mainly 
on the transfer of land titles from the landowner to the tenants with the view of bringing 
about a more egalitarian landownership structure (Kaneda 1980). The objective function 
that the land reform program played in the context of the country’s development path 
was, however, different for Taiwan and Japan, on one hand, and for South Korea, on the 
other.
The formative stages of development in Taiwan and Japan were anchored on the 
broad-based growth of its rural sector (Oshima 1986). With a more egalitarian structure 
realized through the implementation of land reform, the benefits accruing from increases 
in agricultural production and rural income would naturally redound to a larger proportion 
of the rural populace. Increases in production and income were brought about largely 
through measures which (a) enhanced agricultural productivity per worker and per unit of 
land within the framework of small-scale farming, and (b) which expanded the non-farm 
employment opportunities of the rural sector (Kada 1986; Ho 1986).
The mechanisms by which objectives (a) and (b) were achieved by the two countries 
were similar. Specifically, increases in output and factor productivity were achieved 
through a wide diffusion of land-saving and labor-using technologies which enhanced 
multi-cropping intensity and reduced the difficulties of monsoon agriculture. Further, the 
provision of irrigation facilities, extension services, education and credit was likewise 
prioritized. Access to these inputs was facilitated largely through the farmers’ 
organizations and cooperatives.
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Off-farm employment was enhanced from two fronts: First, the governments of 
Taiwan and Japan provided incentives for the relocation of industries in the rural sector 
(Shand 1986; Ho 1986). This was done largely through the construction of rural roads 
and communication facilities as well as the provision of cheap and efficient transport 
system. Not only did these infrastructures link the urban with the rural sector, these also 
enhanced the traffic of agricultural and industrial products (Oshima 1986). Another 
important facility which encouraged rural industrialization was the provision of rural 
electric power (Ho 1986).
The second factor that encouraged off-farm employment was the rise in rural incomes. 
This increased the domestic demand for (a) a wide range of consumer commodities, and 
(b) agro-related downstream and upstream activities, both of which were provided by 
off-farm sector. In turn, the agricultural sector benefited from the wider employment 
opportunities accorded by this sector. The gains from remunerative employment were 
especially helpful in augmenting the income of owners with very small farms and landless 
rural workers.
The mutually reinforcing interaction of off-farm employment and a robust and 
egalitarian agriculture provided the engine for their smooth transition to industrial 
economies. The rapid rise in off-farm employment contributed in reducing the income 
disparities between agricultural and non-agricultural households. With the sustained 
increases in rural incomes through efficient use of labor, surplus labor was released to 
industry.
The continuous interaction of agriculture, off-farm rural and urban industrial sectors 
in Japan and Taiwan also encouraged the former sector to adapt to these changes as more 
rural labor is absorbed by the latter two sectors. Labor-saving technologies, i.e., 
machinery, were employed in the farms and land contract arrangements such as contract 
growing were used. Tenancy contracts are likewise on the upsurge in Japan and clamor in 
the countryside for land consolidation has been increasing (Domer and Thiesenhusen 
1990).
In brief, the agriculture-led strategy adopted by Taiwan and Japan in the 1950s has 
evolved over time. What is essential to emphasize, however, is that the pre-condition for 
a dynamic interaction of the agricultural and off-farm sector was the establishment of a 
more egalitarian agrarian structure. In these two countries, land reform played a pivotal 
role in the initial year? of the agri-led strategy.
B. South Korea
In contrast to the agri-led strategy of Japan and Taiwan, South Korea, after reforming 
the landownership structure, immediately proceeded to an industrialization strategy. It 
prioritized the production of export-led light manufacturing as well as heavy industries 
and neglected the development of the agricultural sector. Development was highly 
concentrated in two centers, Seoul and Pusan, and the construction of infrastructure was 
centralized in these two growth centers. While Taiwan and Japan geographically 
dispersed the industries in the countryside, thereby limiting the migration of rural workers
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to the urban centers, South Korea, through its urban-based industrial development, 
attracted labor surplus from the countryside to the cities which, in the process, created 
problems of overcrowding in the urban centers.
By the 1970s, the farm incomes of South Korea lagged, on the average, by as much as 
30 percent from those of Japan and Taiwan. Korean growth was at least a decade away 
from the Japanese and the potentials for further growth were being hampered by the 
sluggish performance of its agricultural sector (Park 1986). While an egalitarian agrarian 
structure was established in the countryside, rural incomes could not increase 
substantially as incentives for enhancing its production were severely constrained. 
Off-farm employment was also discouraged partly because of the poor infrastructural 
facilities and partly because of sustained increases in rural incomes. By the 1980s, South 
Korea has put more attention toward spurring growth in the rural sector and relocating 
industries in the countryside (Park 1986).
China, Peru and Chile: Failure of Collectives. While China, Peru and Chile 
succeeded in transforming the agrarian structure through the use of land reform, the 
change was basically a shift of ownership from the landowners to the state without the 
accompanying land parcellization. The basic difference among the three country 
experiences was that in China, small-sized farms were agglomerated to form contiguous 
large-sized farms, managed and supervised by parastatal institutions. In the case of Peru 
and Chile, plantations exceeding the hectarage limits were expropriated and the farm sizes 
of expropriated lands were reduced to smaller sizes. Nevertheless, these farms were also 
organized into plantations and were operated by government-owned agencies.
The experiences of the three countries with this type of land reform were analogous. 
Income disparities between and among the collective farms was pronounced (Domer and 
Thiesenhusen 1990; Fuhr 1986; Osorio 1989). Corruption among the parastatal agencies 
was rampant. And increases in agricultural production could not be sustained partly 
because of the limited quantity of and unequal access to productive resources and 
remunerative employment and partly due to the disincentives stemming from the 
non-control of the peasants on the lands that they are cultivating.
It was for these reasons that the governments of the three countries have opted in the 
1980s to re-introduce the private property rights concept. In China, land use rights are 
contracted to the peasants on a long-term basis while in Peru and Chile, landownership 
rights are rapidly being privatized. In the latter two country cases, the role of a politicized 
peasantry and trade union movement was instrumental in bringing about this change of 
heart.
Major Lessons from Cross-country Experiences on Agrarian Reform
The land reform experiences of Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, China, Chile and Peru 
provide the country a perspective as well as the directions for successfully implementing 
this reform measure. Let us briefly discuss these key points.
First, if the Taiwanese, Japanese, and South Korean land reform models have to be 
replicated in the Philippines, the prior political and economic conditions for a successful
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implementation of land reform, while acutely lacking in the Philippines, provide us 
important guideposts for the direction of changes. These are:
(1) Neutralizing the present strong landowner bloc, which would require the 
establishment of an equally strong countervailing force. Such a force has been 
building up in the country. It comprises of the cause-oriented non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), people’s organizations (POs), the academe, a progressive and 
non-traditional business sector, and the Church. What they need is a push to 
institutionalize the alliance and to increase the momentum of their formation as a 
strong countervailing force;
(2) While the country cannot rely on the US and, for that matter, other developed 
countries, for a large financial support, the assistance that they are providing at 
present in the area of support services and infrastructure development, is still a 
substantial amount What the government needs to do is to prioritize the needs of the 
rural sector in terms of support services and infrastructure. In this regard, the 
assistance of the NGOs and the POs in identifying these requirements will be most 
instrumental.
(3) While the government has limited information on landownership and land 
classification, there are available technological hardware which can facilitate the 
generation especially of land classification data. Further, the NGOs and the POs can 
assist in the identification of the landowners; and
(4) The heterogeneous mode of productive organization and the multifarious 
rural stratification which characterize the country’s agrarian structure make the 
agrarian reform measure extremely complicated and difficult to implement. Under 
this scenario, the government has no choice but to take a stand (a) of what mode of 
productive organization is efficient and will result in a more egalitarian 
landownership structure; and (b) which of the rural classes will have to be prioritized 
in order to, promote this productive organization. If the Taiwanese, Japanese and 
South Korean experiences will serve as a guide, then the direction will lie toward 
small-sized farms and the beneficiaries will be mainly tenants, lessees, and a few 
landless workers.
Second, the implementation of land reform requires a strong political will. In all the 
country cases which were examined this was the condition for the implementation and 
completion of this measure. Moreover, these country experiences showed that it has to be 
accomplished swiftly; that the measure should be simple and transparent to minimize 
evasion and rent-seeking activities; that the agency tasked with enforcing it should focus 
mainly on the land acquisition and distribution component; and that other measures (like 
land tax) should accompany its implementation.
Third, land reform should be viewed as an integral component of an overall 
development strategy. In the Taiwanese and Japanese experience, homogenizing the 
landownership structure served as the initial phase and precondition for its transition to 
development With an egalitarian agrarian structure ensured, an agri-led industrialization
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strategy was pursued whereby measures were established which will increase agricultural 
production and raise rural incomes. The latter objective was ensured through the 
promotion of non-farm employment activities which served as the embryonic form of 
industrialization. In brief, agrarian reform, agricultural development, and industrialization 
were viewed not as competing or mutually exclusive approaches to development; rather, 
these were intricately related with agricultural and industrial development to ensure a 
mutually reinforcing process.
The South Korean experience illustrates the case of an export-oriented 
industrialization cum agrarian reform strategy under a market-oriented environment. 
While unprecedented growth was achieved, the lackluster performance of its agricultural 
sector functioned as a deadweight It was apparent in this experience that land reform is 
not the end-all and be-all solution to the agrarian question.
In contrast, China, and to a certain extent, Peru and Chile, pursued a land reform 
strategy which dismantled the traditional landlord class but merely replaced it with the 
state. The end-result was not an egalitarian agrarian structure. A collective/cooperative 
farm estate is a facade for a plantation mode of productive organization and can serve as a 
disincentive structure to agricultural production because the peasants/farmworkers have 
no control or decision-making power over the land that they cultivate.
Fourth, it is not enough to homogenize land ownership structure. Measures toward 
increasing agricultural production and rural income should be pursued vigorously. The 
forms of government intervention employed by the Taiwanese and the Japanese are 
instructive. Let us highlight those which widened the opportunities for non-farm 
employment:
(1) The direction of infrastructural development in the countryside was in (a) roads 
and bridges which not only linked the urban and rural centers but also different rural 
areas; (b) system-wide transportation, with the end-view of providing the public cheap 
fares and efficient service; and (c) electric power.
(2) They emphasized the relocation of industries to the rural sector. The initial 
industries were agro-industrial types and those which provided consumer goods. Some 
industries adopted to the labor utilization pattern of monsoon agriculture (e.g. putting-out 
system); others ensured regular workload. Industrial estates and export processing zones 
may be established so long as they take into account the resource endowments of the 
communities and the participation of community residents in the planning and 
development of these centers.
Lastly, rural development is a dynamic process which necessitates reforms that are 
attuned to economic and political conditions. What is important is the development of 
rural institutions which are responsive and can adjust to these conditions. The most vital 
of these institutions are farmers’ organizations.
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VI. DEFINING SOME RESEARCH AGENDA 
ON AGRARIAN REFORM
The previous sections provided a descriptive assessment of the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) as well as a comparative analysis of the implementation 
of agrarian reform in several Asian and Latin American countries. As a result of this 
examination, several preliminary conclusions were arrived at which, in turn, can serve as 
guideposts for identifying the research issues that need to be addressed in order to 
understand the role of agrarian reform in the dynamics of the country’s rural 
development This section discusses the major research gaps, highlighting die questions 
whose answers can provide policymakers some indicators (a) for determining the form 
and pace of agrarian reform implementation appropriate for the country’s development 
process; and (b) for measuring the importance of agrarian reform vis-a-vis other policy 
reforms in the country’s transition phase to rural development.
Defining an Appropriate Conceptual Framework
The neoclassical political economy framework for explaining the nature and pace of 
land reform implementation in the country was initially developed by Hayami, 
Quisumbing and Adriano (1990). Applying the marginalist concept, they argued that the 
marginal gains accruing to the politicians implementing land reform are inversely related 
to the redistributed land, measured in terms of income transfers to tenants and landless 
rural workers. This means that higher net revenues accrue to the political entrepreneurs if 
lower lands are transferred and vice versa. The slope of the downward-sloping marginal 
revenue curve becomes steeper the more powerful and organized the landlord bloc is 
and/or the more inefficient and corrupt are the government implementors.
In contrast, the marginal cost curve is upward sloping implying that higher per unit of 
redistributed land entails increasing costs measured in terms of numbers of votes lost from 
the land reform opposition bloc. The optimal redistributed land occurs at the intersection 
of the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves.
The authors hypothesize that in the Philippines which is characterized by a powerful 
landlord bloc, an inefficient government bureaucracy, of which a large number of the 
implementors are rent-seekers, a non-existent landownership record, and a relatively 
unorganized peasant and landless rural workers’ group - the marginal gains accruing to 
political entrepreneurs from enforcing land reform are low while the marginal costs for 
implementing it are high. The net result is a low redistributed land coverage.
The model can likewise explain why in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, the coverage 
of land reform was large. Specifically, the economic, political and social conditions 
existing in these countries at that time (refer to Section 5) ensured a much higher marginal 
revenue curve and a much lower marginal cost curve.
The framework is also able to show why the land reform model of these three 
countries (i.e., tenancy reform using a highly interventionist and regulatory approach)
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cannot ensure similar successful results in the Philippines. In particular, the political 
economy configuration in the latter country is not identical to that in Japan, Taiwan, and 
South Korea so that the application of their land reform model has not homogenized 
landownership structure in the Philippines. Instead, its implementation contributed to a 
large degree, in the development of a more heterogeneous agrarian structure (Quisumbing 
and Adriano 1988).
Using the conclusions of this model, Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano (1990) 
proposed an alternative land reform paradigm that takes into account the political, 
economic and social landscape of the Philippines. The alternative paradigm which relies 
on less government intervention and encourages a more market-oriented approach has 
four components: (a) a ceiling on land owned, irrespective of crops grown and tenurial 
status; (b) progressive land tax; (c) deregulation of land contracts; and (d) a progressive 
rent on public lands. It also recommends a long transition phase, sufficient enough to 
encourage the development of institutional arrangements that will promote small-sized 
farms and will reduce the adjustment costs.
Another author who applied the neoclassical political economy framework was 
Balisacan (1990b), explaining why the past redistributive measures implemented in the 
country were optimal considering the political configuration. However, unlike the 
previous authors, Balisacan (1990a) contended that because of the highly unconducive 
political and economic conditions existing in the country at the present time, a 
comprehensive agrarian reform, while effective in bringing about equity, cannot be 
successfully implemented. Instead, he proposes that alternative policy measures especially 
those aimed at increasing rural-based employment and ensuring a rationalized 
macroeconomic trade regime may be more effective in attaining not only equity but also 
growth as well.
The basic difficulty with Balisacan’s recommendations is that the problem of 
inefficient utilization of a very scarce resource, i.e., agricultural land, remains unresolved. 
While he does not totally set aside the implementation of land reform, the conclusion 
from his work implicitly suggests that an incomplete form of land reform will ensue as 
long as the unconducive political and economic environment exists. In turn, this 
inevitably would result in a more heterogeneous agrarian structure which may exacerbate 
the inefficient use of this resource and further increase inequality. Ostensibly, these may 
have adverse implications on rural development.
The above discussion highlights the fact that the employment of the neoclassical 
political economy framework has produced two policy perspectives. One approach 
presumes that land reform is still a viable and necessary policy measure in bringing about 
a more egalitarian rural economy. According to this approach, what is required is the 
formulation of an alternative land reform paradigm which takes into account the political 
and economic environment while simultaneously, laying out the foundation for changing 
the political market. The other approach doubts the feasibility of implementing a 
comprehensive land reform program and contends that its enforcement may be
S3
dispensable considering that other policy measures can serve as substitutes for land 
reform.
The development of these two viewpoints on land reform arises from the static 
analysis of the framework. As Lipton (1991) correctly pointed out, the framework, while 
it is a powerful tool for explaining the nature and pace of land reform implemented in a 
particular political market, does not adequately incorporate the dynamic effects of 
changes arising from the reform. According to Lipton, the analytical content of the 
framework suffers from "a key omission: a government’s political gains and losses from a 
reform depend not only on the numbers and powers of the landowner and beneficiaries, 
but also on the extent of consequential changes in output, income and government tax 
revenue, employment and patronage (p.2)".
To enrich the neoclassical political economy model, one has to include in the 
conceptual framework an explanation for the role of land reform in the dynamics of rural 
development Adelman’s (1984) and Oshima’s (1986) works allude to this role by 
hypothesizing that land reform ensures a more egalitarian rural economy; complemented 
with production-oriented and employment-generating policies, these will increase rural 
incomes which in turn, will initiate rural industrialization.
As in the neoclassical political economy model, Adelman and Oshima use the 
experience of Japan and Taiwan to highlight the pivotal role of land reform in bringing 
about a more egalitarian economy. However, the approach developed by these authors 
failed to conceptualize the different political and economic environments existing 
between Japan and Taiwan, on one hand, and the less developed economies, on the 
other, so that the rural development path employed in the former two countries may not 
necessarily be applicable and will not be found to produce the same results in less 
developed economies. There is thus a need to redefine the conceptual framework of 
Adelman and Oshima, incorporating it within a neoclassical political economy model. A 
combination of these two frameworks will not only define the parameters of a feasible 
land reform but will also identify the policy measures which will complement land reform 
and ensure that the rural development path is tailored to the Philippine political and 
economic conditions. The appropriate mix of these two models clearly needs to be 
elaborated on.
The succeeding subsections discuss the research issues in the land and agrarian 
components of RA 6657, using the aforementioned proposed framework.
Modes o f Productive Organization
Is there a need to maintain plantation agriculture? As illustrated in the previous 
discussions, CARL proposes a bi-modal agrarian structure, i.e., small-sized farms mainly 
in staple crop producing areas and large-sized farms for exportable cash crops. The latter 
modes of productive organization can be exempted from this policy measure through its 
non-land transfer schemes.
One premise for exempting agribusiness plantations is the presumption that 
economies of scale exist. There are four possible sources of scale economies, namely: (a)
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central management; (b) employment of large-scale machinery and infrastructure; (c) the 
need for the close coordination of production, processing, and marketing especially of 
highly perishable commodities; and (d) the need for a uniform application of strict pest 
and disease control.
More systematic researches should verify the degree of importance of these factors in 
ensuring scale economies in plantation agriculture across cash crops and permanent tree 
crops as well as across regions. Also, can institutional arrangements (e.g., 
contract-farming with small farm entrepreneurs) and technological innovations (e.g., 
computerized delivery system cum on-farm railroad infrastructure) overcome these 
economies of scale advantage of large-sized farms? If there are organizational and 
technological innovations which will enable agribusiness enterprises to shift to 
small-sized farm production, what policy measures will influence these enterprises to 
employ the small-sized farm mode? Lastly, Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano (1990) 
contend that there are no scale economies in farm production but may exist in the 
processing and marketing phases; a more in-depth research should be conducted to verify 
this finding.
The other premise for excluding agribusiness plantations from land reform is the 
positive contribution of these enterprises in the country’s foreign exchange earnings; in 
addition, these economic units generate rural employment, pay higher wages, and provide 
infrastructure. The counter-argument is the growing social conflict between plantations 
and local communities, on one hand, and between plantation management and its labor 
force, on the other.
There is a need to empirically measure the social gains and costs of maintaining 
plantation agriculture in an economy with a growingly adverse man-land ratio. More 
specifically, a systematic mechanism for quantifying the net costs arising from the social 
conflicts should be developed. Likewise, alternative institutional arrangements should be 
analyzed which will encourage the continued operations of agribusiness enteiprises under 
a small-sized farm operation.
Aside from the need to examine the viability of maintaining plantation agriculture, 
another problem area is in the administrative and political feasibility of enforcing land 
reform in this sector. First, how shall these types of lands be valued without ensuring a 
huge financial strain on the government, as well as encouraging political resistance? 
Second, what mechanisms will reduce the rent-seeking activities of government 
implementors? Third, how will the lands be subdivided among the farmworkers? Fourth, 
who shall be the appropriate beneficiaries; how will the non-beneficiaries who are 
farmworkers in the plantation be accommodated? Fifth, what institutional arrangements 
should be established that will reduce the disruption costs in farm production during the 
transition phase? Sixth, what shall be the appropriate farm sizes? And lastly, what 
mechanisms will minimize political resistance from the landowner bloc? For instance, for 
lands leased to agribusiness plantations, would a lease-back arrangement with new 
small-scale farmowners be a feasible mode of land contract? Would a progressive land 
rent ensure intensive exploitation of this resource?
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Distribution of Unused Public Land as Substitute for Land Redistribution. Many 
landowners and plantation managers argue that instead of subdividing privately-owned 
lands which arc presently being cultivated, the government should first distribute unused 
public lands. They argue that there are plenty of unused public lands especially in 
Mindanao which can be distributed to landless workers without creating political 
discontentment among the landlord bloc.
Whether or not there are still much unused public lands sufficiently large to solve the 
problem of landlessness is an empirical question. It would be interesting to document the 
existing data on public lands classified in terms of (a) lands leased for logging purposes, 
their area and corresponding lessees; (b) pasture leases; (c) lands leased to public and 
private corporation; and (d) lands with squatters. The land reform options for each public 
land classification should be explored. Specifically, a more empirical analysis of the 
economic and environmental implications of the Integrated Social Forestry Program 
should be conducted. What are the. equity, efficiency and environmental considerations 
for transforming public owned lands leased as extensive cattle ranches into agroforestry 
programs? Will a progressive land rent discourage extensive use of lands; are these 
politically and administratively feasible to implement?
It is obvious that in the medium term, landless workers who will have access to public 
lands will require, among other things, credit, research and extension services, especially 
in agroforestry management and technology, and production infrastructure. How can the 
government tap agribusiness enterprises as well as non-governmental organizations to 
devise institutional arrangements for the provision and delivery of vital infrastructure and 
support services to the land reform beneficiaries?
Peasant-Organized Cooperatives in Plantation Farms. Another land reform 
component of RA 6657 is the transfer of the ownership and management of plantation 
farms to the farmworkers of these plantations who are encouraged under this law to 
organize into cooperatives. Cooperative farms are large-sized farms whose efficiency and 
equity implications have to be thoroughly examined. In particular, are 
cooperative-organized farms more efficient than plantation farms as well as small-sized 
farms? Will cooperative farms ensure a more egalitarian rural base or will it merely shift 
ownership from one group of large landowners to another set of landowners, i.e., the 
cooperatives? What lessons can we learn from the cooperative farms in Latin America?
From the administrative aspect, the major bottleneck will be the determination of 
cooperative members. Should it include supervisory levels or should its membership be 
limited to regular farmworkers? If casual farmworkers, the bulk of the plantation labor 
force, are excluded, what would be its implications on equity? How does one treat newly 
recruited farmworkers? Should rural workers employed in the processing activity be 
excluded? How about family members employed in the plantation; will all of them or 
only one of them serve as a cooperative member?
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Institutional Arrangements
Should share tenancy be regulated? The CARL prohibits the practice of share 
tenancy. However, many conceptual and empirical studies (e.g., Hayami and Otsuka 
1988) have shown that share tenancy is equally efficient as leasehold and 
owner-cultivatorship; indeed, under imperfect market conditions and highly risky 
environments, share tenancy provides advantages over the other two labor contract 
arrangements.
The restriction on sharecropping should be re-examined in the context of providing 
more supply of agricultural ladder "rungs" to landless rural workers and of serving as a 
stop gap measure to the imperfect market and high risk environment Other research 
areas which have to be undertaken to improve the welfare of share tenants are: (a) 
safeguards for security of tenant’s tenure; and (b) mechanisms for broadening the tenant’s 
access to productive resources such as water, credit and research and extension service. 
An important research question pinpointed by Lipton (1991) is the possibility that while 
individual tenants may be equally efficient as owner-cultivators, a "village of tenants- 
plus-landlords may well be less entrepreneurial, or have less investment-oriented capital 
markets, than villages of owner- farmers."
Contract-Farming Arrangement: An Alternative to Plantation Ownership. The
recent work of Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano (1990) showed that contract farming 
arrangement may be a viable mode of operation for agribusiness corporations to maintain 
a large contiguous land without directly owning or leasing these tracts of land. The 
contract essentially requires small growers to produce and harvest the cash crop 
exclusively for their agribusiness partners. In return for an assured supply of the 
commodity, the agribusiness partner guarantees the grower a reasonable farm-gate price 
and supplies the latter with the necessary production inputs, physical infrastructure and 
tecuuicai and financiai assistance.
While the practice of contract farming for cash crops and livestock/hog production 
shows an upward trend, not much work has been done to document and examine the 
arrangement in ensuring efficient use of this scarce resource; in enhancing production; in 
broadening the growers’ access to vital infrastructure, inputs and support services; and in 
promoting land reform. Moreover, at present, the plantation sector has not adopted this 
organizational set-up possibly because of the high cost of contract negotiation and 
supervision. Research undertakings exploring alternative public actions that can 
encourage agribusiness enterprises to implement contract farming and/or introduce other 
institutional arrangements operating within the small-sized farm framework should be 
developed. Likewise, detailed studies which will enforce the bargaining leverage of small 
growers, should be done. Research efforts toward encouraging small contract growers to 
form cooperatives or associations which will not only negotiate effectively with the 
agribusiness partners but will also establish an internal monitoring and supevision scheme 
among the cooperative contract grower members, should be undertaken.
Research Issues in Corporate Stock Distribution. An alternative to the design of 
subdividing plantations into smaller landholdings is corporate stock distribution. Under
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this scheme, corporate landowners are exempted from land reform if they distribute 
corporate stock shares equivalent to the value of the land.
While this institutional arrangement is clearly a mechanism for maintaining large 
landholdings, an in-depth analysis is required that will identify the factors which 
discourage these landowners to employ contract-farming or other land contracts that will 
promote small-scale farm holdings. It will also be interesting to find out why some 
corporate farms have opted for the land reform deferment scheme instead of corporate 
stock distribution. Finally, research should be conducted in farms which already practice 
corporate stock distribution. The objective of this type of research work is twofold: to 
determine whether or not this scheme is beneficial to the farmworkers, and to develop 
mechanisms that will assist farmworkers to effectively monitor their corporate shares.
Leasehold Arrangements: Regulation versus Deregulation. An important policy 
question is the operationalization of effective and efficient leasehold arrangements 
especially in coconut farms. Should the lease rates be regulated or should the government 
allow the markets to determine these rates? What are the costs entailed in both schemes 
and which one would benefit the landless workers? What are the implications of these 
schemes in coconut production and in farms which practice inter-cropping?
Research work should also be undertaken in determining the viability of leaseback 
arrangements in plantation farms. Under this scheme, plantations will first be subdivided 
into small farmholdings: The reform beneficiaries will then have the option of either 
leasing back the rands at market rates to the agribusiness enterprises or undertaking a 
contract-farming arrangement.
Another research area is the recommendation of progressive land rents in public lands 
which can be leased out by the government to private individuals or corporations. In this 
scheme, land rents increase at progressive rates as more lands are required. Will this 
scheme be politically and administratively feasible to implement? What are the major 
bottlenecks and can these problems be resolved through minimal government 
intervention? And will this scheme ensure efficient use of scarce land?
Land Tax
There is an urgent need to conduct a more in-depth analysis on the political and 
administrative feasibility of implementing a land tax measure. While there is no doubt 
that a progressive land tax will complement land reforms and will generate funds for the 
government, its enforcement has been blocked at the legislative level. Are there existing 
laws (e.g., real estate tax) which can be revised to incorporate the essence of a land tax 
measure? If so, how can this be achieved? Are there institutional mechanisms which will 
and can effectively monitor and supervise the implementation of a land tax measure so as 
to minimize the rent-seeking activities of government employees and reduce tax evasion 
by landowners? And lastly, should a land tax be imposed on agrarian reformed lands?
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Land Use Conversion
It is ironic that this country wherein more than half of the population depend, directly 
or indirectly, on land as a primary source of income, does not have a national land use 
policy. Apart from RA 6657 which regulates farmland ownership, a combination of 
conflicting departmental (e.g., the creation of Regional Agro-Industries Centers) and local 
government (e.g., Section 15 of the proposed Local Government Code which allows local 
governments to reclassify 10 percent of agricultural lands into urban or industrial areas) 
directives have been issued and enforced resulting in competing/conflicting land uses. 
Land use decisionmaking at present does not reflect the extent of land scarcity nor does it 
take into account (a) the physiographic and agronomic features of this limited resource; 
(b) the environmental impact of the conversion on the ecosystem of the area; (c) the social 
losses accruing to the communities affected by the land use conversions; (d) the social 
losses that will be borne by future generations; and (e) the implications of these changes 
for ensuring sustainable structure transformation from an agricultural to an industrial 
economy.
In this regard, research devoted to defining an appropriate national land use policy for 
the country will be most useful. The components of the research should include: (a) a 
quantification of the extent of legal and illegal land use conversion; (b) an evaluation of 
government policies affecting land utilization and an assessment of their implications on 
efficiency and equity; (c) fiscal measures that will discourage unproductive land 
speculation activities and encourage intensive utilization of the land; and (d) 
administrative measures that will effectively and efficiently enforce the national land use 
policy.
Land Markets and Financing o f CARL
Because of RA 6657, the sale of agricultural lands is prohibited. This prevents 
potential reform beneficiaries from using their lands as collateral and discourages present 
landowners to subject their lands to land reform, for fear of obtaining lower 
compensation. In addition, since the land payments of the reform beneficiaries are 
usually much lower than the compensation provided by the state to the present 
landowners, this financial gap will only augment the government deficit and, in turn, will 
adversely affect the macroeconomic environment.
Under this scenario, a deregulated land market accompanied by policies which strictly 
enforce the landownership ceiling and a progressive land tax, may be a sensible approach 
to implementing land reform. Landowners are, therefore, free to sell their lands which are 
in excess of the retention limit to prospective buyers who in turn are legally bound not to 
purchase lands in excess of the stipulated landownership ceiling. Likewise, rural 
producers can have an easier access to credit since they can now use their lands as 
collateral. Under this scheme, the strain on the government’s budget will be minimized.
The above proposal merits serious research undertaking especially (a) on its 
administrative and political viability; (b) on its implication on equity; (c) on its effect on 
the government budget; and (d) on its effect on facilitating land reform. Particular areas
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that need more in-depth analysis are: firstly, what mechanisms should be established so 
that landless rural workers will have fair access to these lands? Secondly, what 
administrative systems should be instituted so that the landownership ceiling will be fully 
enforced and rent-seeking activities of the government will be minimized-. Thirdly, what 
role can the NGOs play in assisting share tenants and landless rural workers to acquire a 
competitive edge in the purchase of these lands? And lastly, is a uniform landownership 
ceiling an appropriate policy measure? Should it apply to one household or to each 
member of the households? Further, as Upton (1991) correctly points out, "a two-person 
household with ten reliably irrigated ha of triple-cropped paddy land requires different 
treatment from 10 ill-watered ha of land marginal between grazing and coarse grains."
Role o f NGOs
There is a need to ascertain the role of NGOs in the implementation of land reform. 
For one, many NGOs are major conduits of large internationally-sourced funds. How are 
these funds utilized at present? And what are their implications in facilitating or retarding 
the implementation of land reform?
And second, NGO activities on agrarian reform are apparently stop-gap measures 
which compensate or substitute for the government’s failure to efficiently and effectively 
distribute the lands and provide appropriate support services. Do their activities promote 
or impede the creation of agricultural markets? Do they ensure efficient allocation of 
scarce agricultural lands? And, do they enhance the bargaining leverage of landless 
agricultural workers and provide efficient mechanisms for the provision and delivery of 
support services?
Factors Accounting for Poor Implementation
Lipton (1991) identifies three factors for poor implementation of agrarian reform, 
namely: landlord power, red tapes and rent-seeking activities in the bureaucracy, and laws 
which provide non-conformity to the objectives of land reform. In-depth analyses on 
these three factors should be done. The focus of this type of research works should be on 
the development of alternative policies and administrative systems that will encourage a 
better implementation of agrarian reform.
One important area that needs a thorough examination is the streamlining of the 
Department of Agrarian Reform. Aside from reducing its workforce, there may be a need 
for the Department to concentrate its activities on the land acquisition and distribution 
function. Other departments with CARP-related functions should focus on the provision 
and delivery of support services.
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